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Goals and Governance in Municipal 
Bankruptcy 
Juliet M. Moringiello* 
Abstract 
The years from 2011 to 2013 were remarkable in municipal 
bankruptcy terms. During those years, several cities and counties 
took the rare step of filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. When Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July 2013, 
it became the largest city measured by both population and 
outstanding debt to file for Chapter 9. 
The recent filings challenge the conventional wisdom that 
Chapter 9 is poorly tailored to the rehabilitation needs of larger 
cities and counties. Those who have written about Chapter 9 in the 
past twenty years have treated Chapter 9 and state intervention in 
municipal financial affairs as freestanding alternatives rather 
than as complementary components of a comprehensive municipal 
financial recovery plan. These authors compare municipal 
bankruptcy to corporate bankruptcy and conclude that, because 
Chapter 9 does not incorporate all of the Chapter 11 checks on 
debtor behavior, it cannot adequately promote the financial 
rehabilitation of a sizable general-purpose municipality. This 
approach ignores the original goal of Congress in enacting a 
municipal bankruptcy law in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression, which was to bring together two sovereigns, the state 
and the federal government, to accomplish something that neither 
could accomplish alone—the imposition of a plan to adjust 
municipal debts that would be binding on all creditors, wherever 
located.  
This Article refocuses the discussion about the limitations of 
the municipal bankruptcy process by examining the goals of 
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Chapter 9 and relating its governance provisions to those goals. A 
refocused discussion is particularly timely because the 
deteriorating financial condition of many cities has led states to 
reexamine their programs for resolving municipal financial 
distress and the conditions under which they permit their 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy. Chapter 9 may only be as 
effective as the state governance that accompanies it. Therefore, 
policy makers on the state and federal levels need an 
understanding of the role of Chapter 9 in an integrated scheme for 
municipal financial recovery in order to decide whether and how 
to assist municipalities on the state level and to decide whether 
reforms to Chapter 9 are necessary. 
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I. Introduction 
Municipal bankruptcy occupies a rarely studied corner of 
bankruptcy law. Coverage of its governing Bankruptcy Code 
(Code) chapter, Chapter 9,1 in law school casebooks and treatises 
is almost nonexistent,2 and scholars turn their attention to the 
subject only when a high-profile case is filed.3 There is a simple 
                                                                                                     
 1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012).  
 2. See, e.g., MARGARET HOWARD, BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 21 
(5th ed. 2012) (explaining that Chapter 9 “governs the bankruptcy of 
municipalities [and] is used only occasionally,” and adding that “[w]e will not 
cover it in this casebook”); CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 116–
17 (2d ed. 2009) (giving an overview of Chapter 9; the remaining coverage in the 
over 1,400 page treatise appears on four other pages); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY 
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 109 (6th ed. 2009) 
(devoting about six pages in a 931-page casebook to a description of Chapter 9 
and acknowledging that Orange County filed for bankruptcy). 
 3. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The 
Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local 
Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 625–26 (1994) (considering Bridgeport’s 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing shortly after it happened); David L. Dubrow, 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for Municipalities in Fiscal 
Crisis?, 24 URB. LAW. 539, 539 (1992) (discussing Chapter 9 bankruptcy right 
after Bridgeport, Connecticut, filed for bankruptcy); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax 
Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1997) 
(mentioning Orange County, California’s filing for bankruptcy shortly after the 
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reason for this lack of attention: very few municipalities have 
filed for bankruptcy.4 Fewer than 700 cases have been filed since 
1938,5 when the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a municipal bankruptcy chapter.6 Even this 
number is misleadingly high; the overwhelming majority of the 
municipalities that have filed for bankruptcy were special-
purpose districts such as water and sewer districts7 rather than 
general-purpose municipalities such as cities, counties, and 
towns. 
The years from 2011 to 2013 were therefore remarkable in 
municipal bankruptcy terms. During those years, several general-
purpose municipalities took the rare step of filing for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 9. Among those filing were a small Rhode Island 
city, Central Falls;8 Pennsylvania’s capital city, Harrisburg 
(whose filing was dismissed six weeks later);9 Jefferson County, 
                                                                                                     
county did so); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go 
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 
425, 456 (1993) (mentioning Bridgeport’s 1991 filing in explaining Chapter 9); 
Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal 
Bankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885, 886–87 (2002) (discussing Orange 
County’s bankruptcy filing and its historic effect). 
 4. See JAMES SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER, LLC, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL 
DEBT ADJUSTMENT, app. C (2012), http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bank 
ruptcy_Primer.pdf (showing the historical breakdown of municipal 
bankruptcies, which indicates that only 635 municipal bankruptcies have been 
filed between 1937 and 2012). 
 5. Id. This is a miniscule number; in 2012 alone, 1,221,091 bankruptcy 
petitions were filed under all chapters. U.S. COURTS, BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS 
CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-
MONTH PERIOD ENDING DEC. 31, 2012 (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/1212_f2.pdf. 
 6. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47–48 (1938). 
 7. See SPIOTTO, supra note 4, at app. C (showing that the municipal 
utilities and special districts filings were nearly three times that of cities or 
counties). Under the Bankruptcy Code, a municipality may file only for Chapter 
9, 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012), and the Code defines municipality as “political 
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) 
(2012). Between 1980 and January 31, 2012, 264 municipalities filed petitions 
under Chapter 9, only 49 of which were cities, counties, or towns. 
 8. See Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains 
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, at A21 (explaining that the court confirmed 
the Central Falls plan of adjustment in September 2012). 
 9. Michael Corkery & Kris Maher, Capital Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 13, 2011, at A3; see also In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 765 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (dismissing the Chapter 9 case). 
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Alabama;10 and Stockton, California.11 Just over a month after 
Stockton filed, another California city, San Bernardino, filed for 
Chapter 9 protection.12 The media described the Jefferson County 
and Stockton bankruptcies in superlative terms: Jefferson County 
as the largest municipal bankruptcy ever filed measured by 
outstanding debt,13 and Stockton as the largest city measured by 
population ever to file for bankruptcy.14 Both of these 
municipalities lost their bragging rights in July 2013 when 
Detroit became the largest city, measured by both population and 
outstanding debt, to file for Chapter 9.15 
These recent filings challenge the conventional wisdom that 
Chapter 9 is poorly tailored to the rehabilitation needs of larger 
cities and counties. As news of impending financial doom in 
Harrisburg, Jefferson County, and several California cities 
emerged, so did scholarly articles questioning the utility of 
Chapter 9.16 Authors who have written about municipal 
                                                                                                     
 10. Barnett Wright, Jefferson County Files Largest Government Bankruptcy 
in U.S. History, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2011, 5:00 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/11/jefferson_county_files_for_lar.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 11. Bobby White, Stockton Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J., 
June 29, 2012, at A2. 
 12. See Steven Church, Dawn McCarthy & Michael Bathon, San 
Bernardino, California, Files Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2012, 
7:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-02/san-bernardino-
california-files-for-bankruptcy-protection-2-.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. Wright, supra note 10. 
 14. White, supra note 11. 
 15. Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for Detroit, WALL ST. J., July 19, 
2013, at A1. 
 16. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and 
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012) 
[hereinafter Gillette, Fiscal Federalism]; Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351 
(2010) [hereinafter Kimhi, Solution]; Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and 
Debt, 121 YALE L J. 860 (2012). The financial problems faced by cities have also 
generated discussion about whether states should be permitted to file for 
bankruptcy, something that is currently prohibited. See generally Adam 
Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 81 (2012); Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of 
Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399 (2012); Thomas Moers Mayer, State 
Sovereignty, State Bankruptcy, and a Reconsideration of Chapter 9, 85 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 363 (2011); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State 
“Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011); David A. Skeel, States of 
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bankruptcy in the past twenty years approach Chapter 9 and 
state intervention in municipal financial affairs as freestanding 
alternatives rather than complementary components of a 
comprehensive municipal financial recovery plan.17 From that 
vantage point, they compare Chapter 9 to other bankruptcy 
chapters, notably Chapter 11, and then conclude that because 
Chapter 9 does not incorporate all of the Chapter 11 checks on 
debtor behavior, it cannot adequately promote the financial 
rehabilitation of a sizable general-purpose municipality and is 
thus an undesirable alternative to ex ante state intervention.18 
This approach ignores the original goal of Congress in enacting a 
municipal bankruptcy law in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression. When Congress passed the predecessor to Chapter 9, 
it did so in order to bring together two sovereigns, the state and 
the federal government, to accomplish something that neither 
could accomplish alone—the imposition of a plan to adjust 
municipal financial liabilities that would be binding on all the 
municipality’s creditors, wherever located.19  
At the same time, the deteriorating financial condition of 
many cities has led states to reexamine both their own programs 
for resolving municipal financial distress and the conditions 
under which they permit their municipalities to file for 
bankruptcy. States have unfettered discretion in allowing their 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy; the Code allows a 
municipality to be a debtor under Chapter 9 only if it is 
“specifically authorized” by its state to file for bankruptcy.20 In 
the past few years, several states have revised their laws 
governing the ability of their municipalities to file for 
bankruptcy.21  
                                                                                                     
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012). 
 17. Frederick Tung is the exception. See Tung, supra note 3, at 929 
(concluding that a law requiring the governor to authorize municipal 
bankruptcy filings in California would “encourage early interaction between 
local and state officials and ultimately a cooperative approach to resolving local 
distress”). 
 18. Infra Part II.B. 
 19. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 53–54 (1938). 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012). 
 21. See, e.g., Karol K. Denniston, Neutral Evaluation in Chapter 9 
Bankruptcies: Mitigating Municipal Distress, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 261, 261–62 
(2012) (discussing California’s Assembly Bill 506, which became effective on 
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In this Article, I refocus the discussion about the limitations 
of the municipal bankruptcy process by examining the goals of 
municipal bankruptcy and relating the governance provisions in 
Chapter 9 to those goals in order to illustrate that Chapter 9 is 
only as effective as the state oversight that accompanies it. The 
recent municipal bankruptcy filings, especially that of Detroit, 
illustrate that larger municipalities will resort to Chapter 9 to 
alleviate their financial problems. These filings reopen the 
discussion about the usefulness of Chapter 9. Policy makers on 
the state level need a better understanding of how Chapter 9 
bankruptcy was designed to complement, rather than replace, 
state financial intervention plans. This understanding will help 
them develop comprehensive schemes to deal with their 
distressed cities, towns and counties. Policy makers on the 
federal level must be able to identify the deficiencies in Chapter 9 
in light of this shared governance goal. Chapter 9 was never 
designed to be an independent solution to municipal financial 
problems. An understanding of the goals of Chapter 9 and its role 
in an integrated scheme for municipal financial recovery can 
assist both groups of policy makers in deciding whether and how 
to assist the municipalities on the state level and in deciding 
whether reforms to Chapter 9 are necessary. 
To refocus the discussion about managing municipal 
financial distress, Part II discusses the constitutional 
underpinnings of Chapter 9’s structure as well as the view that 
the structure eviscerates bankruptcy’s effectiveness as a 
                                                                                                     
January 1, 2012, and which requires a California municipality to participate in 
a neutral evaluation process before filing a Chapter 9 petition); Juliet M. 
Moringiello, Specific Authorization to File Under Chapter 9: Lessons from 
Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 248–50 (2012) (explaining that Pennsylvania 
revised its authorization statute in response to Harrisburg’s financial distress); 
Katherine Newby Kishfy, Note, Preserving Local Autonomy in the Face of 
Municipal Financial Crisis: Reconciling Rhode Island’s Response to the Central 
Falls Financial Crisis with the State’s Home Rule Tradition, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 348, 377–82 (2011) (explaining that the Rhode Island General 
Assembly enacted a fiscal oversight statute in response to the financial 
problems in Central Falls); Paul Egan, New Emergency Manager Law Signed, 
But Opponents Already Talking About Legal Challenge, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012312280118 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (discussing the new bill the governor signed into law 
regarding municipal bankruptcy and the likely legal challenges) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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municipal rehabilitation tool. Part III discusses the relationship 
between bankruptcy goals and bankruptcy governance in order to 
explain the governance structure in Chapter 9. I then discuss the 
history of Chapter 9 in Part IV to illustrate that the original 
proponents of a municipal bankruptcy chapter designed it to 
invite the states to manage their municipalities’ use of 
bankruptcy. Part V discusses the extent to which states have 
accepted this invitation to govern their municipalities in 
bankruptcy. Part VI uses a specific example, that of 
Pennsylvania’s response to Harrisburg’s distress, to illustrate the 
confusion that reigns when state policy makers lose sight of 
Congress’s original vision of Chapter 9 as one component of an 
integrated approach to municipal financial distress that 
incorporates both state law and federal bankruptcy law. Part VII 
discusses some of the open issues that remain in Chapter 9 after 
the governance question is answered, and I conclude by 
encouraging policy makers to consider the proper role of 
Chapter 9 as they develop more robust mechanisms to 
rehabilitate their cities.  
II. The Delicate Balance of State and Federal Power Preserved in 
Chapter 9: Does it Render Municipal Bankruptcy Useless? 
Constitutional concerns, coupled with municipal 
bankruptcy’s original limited goal of solving the holdout problem, 
explain the somewhat skeletal nature of Chapter 9. The Tenth 
Amendment limits the control that a federal court can exercise 
over a municipality, and the Contracts Clause limits the ability of 
a state to force a creditor of a city to accept less than what it is 
owed.22 As a result, although today’s Chapter 9 is modeled more 
closely on Chapter 11 than were its predecessor statutes,23 it 
lacks many of the elements of Chapter 11 that give creditors 
some control over the debtor.24 The structure of Chapter 9 
                                                                                                     
 22. See infra notes 205–06 and accompanying text (discussing the 
constitutional implications of municipal bankruptcy). 
 23. See Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1157–62 (1976) (explaining the 1976 
amendments to Chapter 9’s predecessor statute). 
 24. See Dubrow, supra note 3, at 547 (“[U]nder Chapter 9 creditors have 
fewer tools to intervene in the reorganization process than do creditors under 
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appears to grant the governing body of a municipality in 
Chapter 9 exclusive management of the municipality’s future 
destiny.25 Chapter 9 does not require this state of affairs, 
however. Congress did not design municipal bankruptcy law to 
give a municipality unfettered control over its reorganization 
process; rather, it carefully designed the law to respect each 
state’s ability to control the financial rehabilitation of its cities.26 
In this section, I will explain the major differences between 
Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 and then discuss the prevailing 
criticisms of Chapter 9.  
A. Chapter 9 and Control over the Debtor and Its Property 
Chapter 9 incorporates many elements of other types of 
bankruptcy, Chapter 11 in particular. An automatic stay of all 
actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property arises 
immediately upon filing.27 The debtor must propose a plan of 
adjustment, which is Chapter 9’s version of the Chapter 11 plan 
of reorganization.28 The debtor may assume or reject executory 
contracts, including collective bargaining agreements.29 The 
municipality’s creditors vote on the plan, and the voting 
requirements are similar to those found in Chapter 11.30 Like 
Chapter 11, Chapter 9 contains a cramdown provision, which 
                                                                                                     
Chapter 11.”). 
 25. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (limiting the power and jurisdiction of the 
court particularly over the “political or governmental powers of the debtor”). 
 26. See id. § 903 (reserving state power to control municipalities).  
 27. See id. § 901(a) (incorporating the automatic stay provided by § 362); 
see also id. § 922 (extending the stay to actions against an “officer or inhabitant 
of the debtor that seeks to recover a claim against the debtor”). 
 28. See id. § 941 (requiring the debtor to file a plan for the adjustment of 
debts). 
 29. See id. § 901(a) (incorporating § 365); see also King, supra note 23, at 
1169 (explaining that labor contracts may be a partial cause of a municipality’s 
financial problems); Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for 
Negotiated Modification of Public Sector Bargaining Agreements Rejected Under 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 276–81 (1985) 
(discussing the legislative history behind the inclusion of the right to reject 
collective bargaining agreements in Chapter 9). 
 30. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating all of the voting 
requirements of § 1126 except for those dealing with voting by holders of equity 
interests in the debtor). 
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provides that the plan can be imposed on nonconsenting creditors 
if at least one class of creditors accepts the plan and the plan is 
fair and equitable.31 These elements give a municipality some of 
the important bankruptcy benefits available to business entities: 
a stay of all collection actions, the ability to reject burdensome 
contracts, and the ability to impose a plan on nonconsenting 
creditors. In other ways, Chapter 9 is significantly different from 
Chapter 11. 
Chapter 9 explicitly respects state sovereignty. It eschews 
any limitation on the state’s power “to control, by legislation or 
otherwise, a municipality of or in such state in the exercise of the 
political or governmental powers of such municipality,”32 but 
limits this sovereignty by prohibiting states from passing laws 
that would bind nonconsenting creditors to a plan of debt 
adjustment.33 When Congress added this limitation to the 
municipal bankruptcy chapter in 1946, it did so recognizing that 
investors throughout the country held the bonds of many 
municipalities.34 Therefore, even if, as the Court had held in 
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,35 the Contracts 
Clause did not prohibit a state plan of debt adjustment, Congress 
believed that a uniform federal process for imposing a plan on 
nonconsenting creditors was preferable to a mélange of state 
processes.36 In further recognition that federal law cannot usurp 
a state’s role in municipal oversight, Chapter 9 prevents the 
bankruptcy court from interfering with a municipality’s political 
                                                                                                     
 31. See id. § 901 (incorporating the cramdown provisions of § 1129(b)(1) 
and (b)(2)(A), (B)). 
 32. Id.  
 33. See id. (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of 
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not 
consent to such composition.”). Congress added this limitation to overrule the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 
U.S. 502, 516 (1942), which upheld a state’s ability to impose a plan of 
adjustment on a municipality’s nonconsenting creditors. See McConnell & 
Picker, supra note 3, at 462 (explaining that Congress enacted § 903 to overrule 
Faitoute); Tung, supra note 3, at 889 n.16 (discussing the legislative history of 
the predecessor to § 903). 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at 4 (1946).  
 35. 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
 36. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at 4 (1946) (“[B]ankruptcy law under which 
bondholders of a municipality are required to surrender or cancel their 
obligations should be uniform throughout the 48 states . . . .”).   
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and governmental powers and from interfering with the 
municipality’s use of its property.37  
This respect for state sovereignty explains the remainder of 
Chapter 9. The partial incorporation of Chapter 11 concepts 
reflects the fact that the bankruptcy court, as an arm of the 
federal government, must refrain from interfering with the 
governance of a municipality.38 As a result, missing from 
Chapter 9 are many of Chapter 11’s provisions designed to give 
creditors some control over the Chapter 11 outcome. The default 
rule in Chapter 11 is that the existing managers of the debtor 
entity remain in control of the debtor as “debtor in possession.”39 
At the request of a creditor or any other party in interest, the 
court can replace the debtor in possession with a trustee if the 
court finds that the corporate managers have engaged in certain 
misconduct such as fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross 
mismanagement.40 Although the courts view the appointment of a 
Chapter 11 trustee as an extraordinary remedy,41 the threat of 
such an appointment theoretically serves as a check on the 
debtor’s behavior.42 Chapter 11 also allows a court to appoint an 
examiner to investigate allegations of fraud and other misconduct 
on the part of the debtor.43 Because Chapter 9 specifically 
prohibits the bankruptcy court from interfering with any of the 
                                                                                                     
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). The debtor may, however, consent to such 
interference. See id. (explaining that inference is blocked “[n]otwithstanding any 
power of the court, unless the debtor consents”).  
 38. See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text (discussing Tenth 
Amendment limitations in bankruptcy).  
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (defining “debtor in possession”); see also id. § 1107 
(granting to the debtor in possession all of the rights and powers of a trustee). 
 40. Id. § 1104(a)(1). 
 41. In re Euro-Am. Lodging Corp., 365 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2007); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 42. See In re Euro-Am. Lodging Corp., 365 B.R. at 427–28 (discussing when 
and why a trustee should be appointed). In the early years of Chapter 11, 
commentators noted that despite these theoretical controls on management, 
corporate management was rarely ousted in Chapter 11 cases, and thus the 
debtor had excessive control over the proceedings. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code—First Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 103 (1983) 
(observing that creditors in the first three years of Chapter 11 practice rarely 
used three tools often viewed as giving creditors control over the proceedings: 
involuntary petitions, creditors’ committees, and creditor-proposed plans). 
 43. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012). 
414 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403 (2014) 
political or governmental powers of the debtor municipality,44 it 
lacks these constraints on the debtor and prevents the court from 
appointing a trustee or an examiner in a Chapter 9 case.45 
The Chapter 9 mandate that the court not interfere with the 
municipality’s management of its property is illustrated by the 
absence of an estate in a Chapter 9 case. Absent from the list of 
sections included in Chapter 9 is § 541, which provides that the 
commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate that is 
comprised of all “legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case.”46 The absence of 
an estate, coupled with the Code’s prohibition against court 
interference with any of the property or revenues of the 
municipal debtor,47 ensures that neither the court nor any 
creditor can determine how a municipal debtor uses its property. 
No party in interest can object to the debtor municipality’s use or 
disposition of such property; the debtor may use, lease, or sell it 
in Chapter 9 without asking the court for permission.48 
Other omissions from Chapter 9 reflect the congressional 
decision to leave the management of an insolvent municipality to 
the municipality itself and its state. Most notably, only the debtor 
can propose a plan of adjustment.49 Creditors have no opportunity 
to do so; therefore, the debtor’s exclusivity period is unlimited.50 
Somewhat less importantly, given the small number of 
involuntary bankruptcies,51 only the municipality itself may file 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. § 904(1). 
 45. See id. § 901 (incorporating numerous Code provisions into Chapter 9 
but omitting § 1104). 
 46. Id. § 541(a)(1); see also id. §§ 901, 902(1) (defining “property of the 
estate” for Chapter 9 purposes as “property of the debtor”). 
 47. Id. § 904(2). 
 48. See id. § 363 (placing conditions on the debtor’s use, sale, and lease of 
estate property); id. § 901 (omitting § 363 from the sections applicable in 
Chapter 9). 
 49. See id. § 941 (giving the debtor the authority to file a plan of 
adjustment). 
 50. See id. § 901 (omitting § 1121 from list of sections included in Chapter 
9); see also id. § 1121(c) (granting parties in interest the authority to file a plan 
of reorganization after the expiration of the debtor’s exclusivity period). 
 51. See Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions 
and Why the Number is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 805 (2011) (“[A] 
surprisingly small number of involuntary petitions are filed each year.”). 
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for bankruptcy. There is no such thing as an involuntary 
Chapter 9.52 
Although the foregoing provisions are sometimes cited as 
giving the municipal debtor excessive control over the bankruptcy 
case,53 they should be viewed less as an effort to give the 
management of the municipality exclusive control than to balance 
the constitutional powers of the state and federal governments. A 
common criticism of Chapter 9 is that, by excessive deference to 
local control, Chapter 9 presumes that a municipality will exit 
bankruptcy in the same form as it entered bankruptcy.54 A more 
accurate approach to Chapter 9’s structure is to view Chapter 9 
as a sometimes-necessary component of a state or local plan for 
municipal financial recovery. Chapter 9 does not require a 
municipality to exit bankruptcy in the same form as it entered 
the process. Instead, Chapter 9 leaves governance decisions to 
entities other than the creditors and the bankruptcy judge and 
invites the state to provide such governance.55 The real 
governance vacuum in Chapter 9 emerges when the state fails to 
provide any direction for the financial rehabilitation of its cities. 
Unlike Chapter 11,56 Chapter 9 has strict entry 
requirements.57 These eligibility requirements, which make the 
                                                                                                     
 52. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (authorizing involuntary petitions only in 
Chapters 7 and 11). 
 53. See, e.g., Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 380 (stating that because 
the court has no authority to intervene in a city’s governance, the same officials 
that controlled the locality before the filing continue to manage it); Kordana, 
supra note 3, at 1046 (describing Chapter 9 as having a “pro-debtor” 
orientation). 
 54. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 297 (stating that once 
a state has permitted a municipality to file for bankruptcy, the exercise of the 
bankruptcy option lies completely in the debtor’s control); Kimhi, Solution, 
supra note 16, at 380 (stating the same officials who managed the city prior to 
bankruptcy do so during and after the bankruptcy); McConnell & Picker, supra 
note 3, at 427 (identifying, as a premise of Chapter 9, that the municipality will 
have the same “boundaries, resources, functions, and governing structure” after 
bankruptcy that it did before filing for bankruptcy). 
 55. See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of 
a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such 
State . . . .”). 
 56. See id. § 109(d) (stating that any person who can file for Chapter 7 may 
file for Chapter 11). 
 57. See id. § 109(c) (stating that to file under Chapter 9 the debtor must 
meet five criteria). 
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state the Chapter 9 gatekeeper,58 illustrate that Chapter 9 is 
better viewed as a component of a state plan to resolve the 
financial distress of its municipalities than an independent 
alternative to state intervention. 
A municipality may be a debtor under Chapter 9 only if it: 
(1) is a municipality, (2) is insolvent, (3) desires to adjust its 
debts, (4) has negotiated in good faith with its creditors or can 
show that such negotiation would be futile, and (5) is specifically 
authorized by its state to be a debtor under Chapter 9.59 In 
addition, the court may dismiss the debtor’s petition if it finds 
that the debtor did not file it in good faith.60 Chapter 9’s 
eligibility requirements provide the governance functions that 
further the goals of Chapter 9. The requirement that does so most 
explicitly is the specific authorization requirement, which shows 
the intent of Congress to give states the first opportunity to 
resolve the financial distress of their municipalities and invite 
the federal power to help if necessary. When states accept this 
invitation by making Chapter 9 a component of a comprehensive 
state oversight program, they provide governance that best 
furthers Chapter 9’s primary goal of restoring municipalities to 
financial viability by bringing together the state and the federal 
government to do something that neither one could accomplish 
alone. When states do not accept that invitation, Chapter 9 may 
provide the debtor with only a fresh financial start. In those 
states, the eligibility requirements allow the court to assess 
whether the debtor should use Chapter 9 to obtain that fresh 
start. 
B. Does Chapter 9 “Work?”: A Survey of Recent Scholarship 
Municipal bankruptcy scholarship comes in waves. In the 
1930s, when widespread municipal defaults drove Congress to 
pass the first municipal bankruptcy law, scholarship about 
municipal bankruptcy focused on the desirability of a federal law 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. § 109(c)(2) (“An entity may be a debtor under Chapter 9 of this 
title if such entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . by state law, or by a 
governmental officer . . . .”). 
 59. Id. § 109(c). 
 60. Id. § 921(c). 
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to overcome the inability of states to comprehensively resolve the 
financial distress of their cities and the desired components of 
such a law.61 Scholarship about municipal bankruptcy waned 
until the 1970s when New York City’s financial crisis led 
Congress to amend the municipal bankruptcy chapter.62 The 
scholarship from the 1970s until 1990 focused primarily on the 
various amendments to the municipal bankruptcy law and how 
they would enable larger cities to file.63  
Beginning in the 1990s, scholars began to question both the 
wisdom of a federal municipal bankruptcy chapter and the 
efficacy of the existing law. Authors in this post-1990 era of 
Chapter 9 scholarship concur that Chapter 9 is a poor tool for 
resolving the financial problems facing municipalities in large 
part because of its lack of governance controls over municipal 
debtors.64 
In this section, I summarize the post-1990 scholarly debate 
in order to refocus it. Although the recent Chapter 9 filings have 
exposed numerous questions about how Chapter 9 should work,65 
the open questions in Chapter 9 do not arise from the governance 
deficiencies identified by the post-1990 authors. I discuss the 
governance concerns of these authors below before I turn, in Part 
IV, to a discussion of the history of Chapter 9 to illustrate that 
Congress designed Chapter 9 to assist, rather than replace, states 
in resolving municipal financial distress.  
                                                                                                     
 61. See infra Part III (discussing the goal-oriented governance of 
bankruptcy law). 
 62. See generally Dubrow, supra note 3, at 545; infra notes 265–76 and 
accompanying text. 
 63. See Robert S. Amdursky, The 1988 Municipal Bankruptcy 
Amendments: History, Purposes, and Effects, 22 URB. LAW. 1, 2–4 (1990) 
(describing the history of the amendments and their purpose); see also infra 
notes 265–85 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments and 
scholarship). 
 64. See infra notes 66–121 and accompanying text (discussing the post-
1990 scholarship regarding municipal bankruptcy). 
 65. Infra Part V. 
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1. Is Chapter 9 Based on a Faulty Premise? 
Michael McConnell and Randal Picker wrote the first post-
1990 academic municipal bankruptcy article. In their expansive 
article, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to 
Municipal Bankruptcy,66 they criticized both the limited goals of 
Chapter 9 and its efficacy in achieving those goals.67 When 
McConnell and Picker wrote their article, most of the general-
purpose municipalities that had filed for bankruptcy were small 
cities seeking to escape the collection of large judgments against 
them and all of those cases were dismissed.68 The only city of any 
size that had filed was Bridgeport, Connecticut, and its filing had 
been dismissed for failure to meet the Code’s entry 
requirements.69 Both New York and Cleveland had experienced 
significant financial difficulties that were due in large part to 
municipal mismanagement, and neither one resorted to 
Chapter 9 to solve its problems.70 McConnell and Picker’s 
prescriptions for a better municipal bankruptcy chapter were 
therefore based on two observations: that very few general-
purpose municipalities file for bankruptcy and the ones that do 
are very small, and that the one that needed reorganization, 
Bridgeport, was not permitted to reorganize in bankruptcy.71 
According to McConnell and Picker, the underlying premise 
of Chapter 9 is flawed. They posit that Chapter 9 is based on the 
                                                                                                     
 66. See generally McConnell & Picker, supra note 3.  
 67. See id. at 427 (“[W]e suggest that bankruptcy law could serve more 
ambitious purposes than mere debt adjustment . . . .”). 
 68. See id. at 471 (discussing the major cities to file bankruptcy up to that 
point and noting that Bridgeport, Connecticut, was the largest city to file); 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BANKRUPTCIES, 
DEFAULTS, AND OTHER LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 8–10 
(1985), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/policy/a-99.pdf (giving an 
overview of the major cities to file for bankruptcy). 
 69. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) 
(holding that the city did not prove that it was insolvent). 
 70. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 472. 
 71. See id. at 470–71 (discussing the municipal bankruptcy filings between 
1938 and 1972). In the more than two decades since McConnell and Picker 
wrote, few municipalities of any size have filed, and other authors have cited 
this as evidence of Chapter 9’s ineffectiveness in restoring cities to fiscal health. 
See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 16, at 881 (“Currently, the Bankruptcy Code 
seems to be of limited use.”). 
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belief that “all the cities need is relief from their present 
creditors.”72 From that foundation, they reason that because 
Chapter 9 assumes that “the city will emerge from bankruptcy in 
the same form . . . with which it entered bankruptcy,” Chapter 9 
does not support or encourage the efficient reorganization of 
cities.73 As a result, municipal bankruptcy provides only a fresh 
start for cities, and it does not even do that very well because by 
allowing a city to keep all of its assets and discharge its debts, it 
creates the moral hazard of permitting a city to devote its 
resources to itself while escaping its debts.74 McConnell and 
Picker compare the fresh start goal to the Chapter 11 goal of 
efficient reconfiguration of assets and find the fresh start, as 
applied to municipalities, to be unsatisfying.75 
Others have repeated the concern that because all Chapter 9 
does is grant a fresh start to a city, it is not a useful 
rehabilitation tool. Those who express this concern contend that 
Chapter 9 assumes no operational restructuring. Michelle Wilde 
Anderson presented municipal dissolution as an option that 
states should consider in resolving the distress of cities.76 She 
based her contention that bankruptcy and dissolution are 
“independent measures” on the assumption that municipal 
bankruptcy must preserve a municipality’s broken form.77 
Clayton Gillette presented his criticisms of Chapter 9 as a set of 
concerns that the parallel state and federal systems for resolving 
municipal financial distress may lead to undesirable strategic 
behavior on the part of municipalities,78 a criticism based on the 
                                                                                                     
 72. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 494; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
1063, 1074 (2013) [hereinafter Skeel, Is Bankruptcy the Answer] (making a 
similar point in supporting a bankruptcy mechanism for states). 
 73. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 427. 
 74. Id. at 476. 
 75. Id. at 469–70. 
 76. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1365 
(2012) [hereinafter Anderson, Dissolving Cities]. 
 77. Id. at 1384–85. 
 78. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 319–20 (“[C]urrent 
local officials are likely . . . to discount the effects of future higher credit costs in 
favor of the political benefits of favoring residents.”). Because a state can limit 
its municipalities’ access to bankruptcy, the only likely result of a strategic 
threat to file might be its impact as a catalyst to legislative action. Infra notes 
380–82 and accompanying text. 
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observation that “the underlying assumption [of Chapter 9] 
appears to be that localities should be preserved in their current 
form, free from judicial reorganization.”79 As an example of 
strategic behavior, he presents the possibility of a municipality 
that, when faced with the choice of a state bailout that would 
require structural changes to its operations, might choose 
bankruptcy instead, which would shift the losses to creditors and 
allow the municipality to operate without effecting needed 
structural reform.80 
Omer Kimhi likewise begins with the Chapter 11 comparison 
to identify deficiencies in Chapter 9.81 Underlying his criticism is 
his view that Chapter 9 is based on the assumption that once a 
city’s financial hardship is resolved through the bankruptcy 
process, the city can be rehabilitated for the benefit of both its 
citizens and its creditors.82 Several years later, he described 
Chapter 9 as “a solution in search of a problem,” in part because 
it does “little to address the root causes of the economic 
deterioration” of cities.83  
The post-1990 authors saw Chapter 9 as a puzzle. Although 
an insolvent municipality is an entity that should be restructured 
both financially and operationally in order to succeed post-
bankruptcy, the goal of Chapter 9 appears to be a fresh financial 
start, which is the goal that bankruptcy has for individuals. 
Bankruptcy cannot force an individual to change her habits, but 
it can enable stakeholders in an entity to force changes in the 
debtor entity’s corporate structure.84 Therefore, there appears to 
                                                                                                     
 79. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 292. 
 80. See id. at 286 (“[I]f bankruptcy is a plausible option for distressed 
municipalities . . . then local officials may use the threat of bankruptcy to reduce 
the conditions that states place on a proposed bailout.”). Given the power of each 
state to prevent its municipalities from filing for bankruptcy, it is unlikely that 
such a strategic use would be successful. See infra Part VI (discussing 
Pennsylvania’s rejection of Harrisburg’s attempt to use bankruptcy in a 
strategic manner). 
 81. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal 
Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 651 (2008) [hereinafter Kimhi, Reviving 
Cities] (“Similar to chapter 11’s procedures, chapter 9 offers two routes for the 
plan’s confirmation . . . .”). 
 82. Id. at 654. 
 83. Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 380. 
 84. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 470 (“In the case of business 
corporations, we readily recognize that the entity’s size and scope of operations 
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be a mismatch between the goal of Chapter 9 and the governance 
that it provides: the identified goal allows for no bankruptcy 
governance over a debtor who may desperately need appropriate 
restructuring governance.85  
The authors propose to solve their puzzle in two ways: add 
the missing piece by providing for more robust judicial 
supervision over Chapter 9 debtors86 or scrap the puzzle 
altogether and leave the resolution of municipal financial distress 
entirely in state hands.87 Below, I discuss both these 
prescriptions and the problems inherent in both. 
2. Does Chapter 9 Give Too Much Power to the Debtor?  
One way to solve the governance problem identified above 
would be to grant the bankruptcy courts enhanced powers in 
Chapter 9. Authors who have found the fresh start goal to be 
unsatisfactory suggest that a municipal bankruptcy regime 
should force the efficient reconfiguration of a city.88 If a 
municipality is more like an entity than an individual, they 
reason, then perhaps Chapter 9 should be refashioned to force 
structural changes at the municipal level. Some scholars who 
have written about Chapter 9 since 1990 reject the fresh start 
goal and its corresponding absence of debtor governance and urge 
that Chapter 9 should encourage the efficient reconfiguration of a 
                                                                                                     
can be changed, and even that the corporation can be liquidated altogether.”). 
 85. See id. (noting that while bankruptcy law can dismember a private 
corporation, “what may be surprising is that we do not dismember municipal 
corporations either”); Schragger, supra note 16, at 881 (noting that municipal 
bankruptcy is of limited use because it “does not contemplate the kinds of 
reorganizations that are possible on the private side”). 
 86. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 494 (“We have suggested that 
a more powerful bankruptcy court, grounded in state rather than federal law, 
would better serve the purposes of bankruptcy and improve the lot of financially 
troubled cities.”). 
 87. See id. (“[I]t serves little use . . . by restricting state laws directed at 
solving the holdout problem, [it] even impedes the ability of states to institute 
superior schemes for dealing with cities that have gone broke.”). 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 482–83 (arguing that the “fresh start” rehabilitation goal 
is insufficient and that municipal liquidation is a feasible and appropriate 
alternative).  
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municipality’s structure, just as Chapter 11 does for business 
entities.89 
To support their position that Chapter 9 assumes that the 
structure of a city will remain the same after discharge as it was 
before filing, several authors point to the limited powers that 
Chapter 9 grants to the bankruptcy court.90 Because of these 
limited powers, these critics contend that Chapter 9 grants 
excessive powers to the debtor itself, reducing the chances of a 
successful reorganization because the same elected officials who 
ran the city poorly will continue in office during and after the 
bankruptcy.91 Moreover, those elected officials are likely to 
refrain from making unpopular adjustments, such as tax 
increases, in order to remain in their positions.92 Likewise, 
because only the debtor may file a plan of debt adjustment, some 
fear that the municipality retains excessive leverage over its 
creditors in that the creditors are faced with a choice of either 
“languishing in bankruptcy or approving the municipality’s 
plan.”93 
Because McConnell and Picker believe that Chapter 9 should 
more explicitly foster the reorganization of a city, they identify 
Chapter 9’s fundamental flaw as its limitations on the 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. (stating that when a municipality cannot pay its bills, 
something more than a fresh start may be necessary).  
 90. See id. at 472 (explaining that the Code explicitly prohibits courts from 
interfering with a municipal debtor’s political or governmental powers); 
Schragger, supra note 16, at 881 (observing that Chapter 9 does not allow a 
judge to order the involuntary dissolution of a city); Tung, supra note 3, at 898 
(stating that Chapter 9 gives a municipal debtor a “hefty club to wield over 
creditors, without giving creditors much in the way of protective mechanisms 
that are available in corporate and individual bankruptcy”). 
 91. See Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 380–81 (explaining that the 
bankruptcy court has no authority to affect the control exercised by municipal 
officials); Kordana, supra note 3, at 1046 (describing Chapter 9 as having a “pro-
debtor” orientation); McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 472–73 (explaining 
that a city’s paralyzing financial difficulties are often the result of a poorly 
functioning city government); Skeel, Is Bankruptcy the Answer, supra note 72 
(explaining that the existing decisionmakers retain control in a Chapter 9). 
 92. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 320–21 (positing that 
local officials will value the political benefits of favoring resident interest groups 
like public employees over the financial benefits of favoring nonresident 
bondholders). 
 93. Kordana, supra note 3, at 1041. 
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bankruptcy court’s powers.94 From this premise, they reason that 
an effective bankruptcy system should give courts the power to 
take actions to restructure a city. Among the powers that 
McConnell and Picker recommend are the power to order the levy 
and collection of taxes, the power to order reductions in wasteful 
municipal expenditures, the power to seize income streams for 
bond repayment purposes, and the power to sell some municipal 
property.95 They cite this last power as particularly important 
because they identify the ability of a city to discharge debt while 
retaining its assets as “the principal source of the moral hazard 
problem in municipal bankruptcy.”96  
Gillette echoes these suggestions as a solution to the 
possibility of a municipality using the threat of municipal 
bankruptcy in a strategic fashion. A bankruptcy court could 
refuse to confirm a plan of adjustment that did not provide for tax 
increases,97 but Gillette argues that Congress should give the 
courts more explicit powers over city governance. He suggests 
that the bankruptcy court be given the power to impose 
adjustments to both taxes and spending in order to deter 
municipalities from seeking Chapter 9 protection to avoid making 
politically unpalatable choices that would impose the costs of 
financial distress on city residents rather than creditors.98 
Gillette’s strategic bankruptcy argument is similar to McConnell 
                                                                                                     
 94. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479 (arguing that courts in 
bankruptcy cases cannot successfully operate without “far-reaching power”). 
 95. Id. at 475–76. 
 96. Id. Kevin Kordana doubts that municipal bankruptcy presents a 
significant moral hazard problem. See Kordana, supra note 3, at 1085–89 
(offering empirical evidence that defaults on government debt remain rare 
despite the fact that creditor collection remedies against government debtors are 
limited because of the “dynamic game” aspects of municipal borrowing).  
 97. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012) (authorizing the court to confirm a plan 
of adjustment if it is in the best interest of creditors); id. § 1129(b)(2) (requiring 
that a plan be fair and equitable towards an impaired class of creditors that 
opposes the plan and incorporated into Chapter 9 by § 901); see also Fano v. 
Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1940) (refusing 
to confirm a plan of adjustment that did not raise taxes and holding that the 
plan was neither fair and equitable nor in the best interest of creditors). 
 98. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 326 (maintaining that 
such “resource adjustments” will effectively deter strategic use of municipal 
bankruptcy where “lack of political will rather than destitution explains local 
resistance to resource adjustments”). 
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and Picker’s moral hazard argument; in both articles, the authors 
express the fear that if too much discretion is left in a municipal 
debtor’s hands, municipal debtors will seek an easy out that will 
allow them to escape debts without making necessary structural 
changes.99  
Inherent in these criticisms of Chapter 9 is the observation 
that if a city files for bankruptcy, the city is in complete control of 
its destiny, free of external supervision. Gillette contends that 
once a state has permitted bankruptcy, the decision to file is 
exclusively within the control of the municipality.100 Chapter 9 
does not require this result, however. The Code limits the 
bankruptcy court’s power over the municipal debtor and its 
property,101 but in doing so it refrains from imposing limits on a 
state’s powers over its municipalities.102 Rather than leaving 
power in the hands of a debtor municipality, these sections, when 
read together with the requirement that a state specifically 
authorize its municipalities to file, allow the state to exercise as 
much control as it desires.103 
McConnell, Picker, and Gillette recognized the legal 
impediments to their suggestions. The Code specifically prohibits 
the bankruptcy court from interfering with any of the 
municipality’s political powers,104 but the authors suggested that 
this statutory restriction be relaxed.105 Nevertheless, they 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 297; McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 477. 
 100. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 329. 
 101. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (mandating that the bankruptcy court cannot 
“interfere” with the “use or enjoyment” of any “property” or “revenues” of the 
debtor municipality). 
 102. See id. § 903 (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a 
State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in 
the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality . . . .”). 
 103. McConnell and Picker recognize this, but discuss state intervention as 
an alternative, rather than a complement to, Chapter 9. See McConnell & 
Picker, supra note 3, at 462, 479 (acknowledging that Chapter 9 “explicitly 
protects the rights of the state to control its political subdivisions” but 
maintaining that “federal bankruptcy is an alternative to state reform rather 
than supplemental to it”).  
 104. 11 U.S.C. § 904. 
 105. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 297 (arguing for the 
repeal of the “strictures” of Section 904 in order to explicitly authorize judicial 
discretion over municipal resource adjustments); McConnell & Picker, supra 
note 3, at 474–75 (arguing that the Code should be reformed to permit 
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conceded that such powers might violate the Tenth Amendment 
and concluded that perhaps a federal bankruptcy chapter is 
unnecessary.106 Their conclusion that states should be empowered 
to enact municipal bankruptcy regimes, however, raises 
Contracts Clause issues.107 
3. Must Chapter 9 and State Intervention Run on Parallel Tracks? 
The authors discussed above described state intervention and 
federal municipal bankruptcy as parallel independent systems. 
McConnell and Picker stated this explicitly by describing 
bankruptcy as “an alternative to state reform rather than 
supplemental to it.”108 This view of Chapter 9 and state 
intervention as mutually exclusive alternatives is consistent with 
some authors’ characterization of Chapter 9 as a way for a city to 
obtain easy debt relief without making the changes necessary to 
both provide essential services and avoid financial ruin in the 
future.109 If that is the case, Chapter 9 is of course undesirable. 
No one wants a city to go through the expense and bad press of 
bankruptcy just to emerge from bankruptcy in the same 
distressed form in which it entered.  
The superior ability of each state to remedy its cities’ 
financial distress is beyond question. A state can make structural 
changes that can prevent or alleviate municipal financial 
distress, something a bankruptcy court cannot do. A state can 
intervene in a city’s financial distress by establishing a financial 
                                                                                                     
bankruptcy judges to exercise more discretion over municipal taxing and 
spending powers). 
 106. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479 (“It may well be, therefore, 
that federal municipal bankruptcy law is even more fundamentally 
misconceived than at first appeared: there shouldn’t be any.”). 
 107. Id. at 479–80. This, of course, would likely violate the Contracts Clause. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . make any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
 108. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479. 
 109. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 291–92 (suggesting 
that the objective of Chapter 9 is “simply to allow a financially distressed city to 
restructure its monetary obligations, not to restructure the city government or 
liquidate its assets for the benefit of creditors”); Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra 
note 81, at 653 (stating that bankruptcy allows municipalities to avoid paying 
their creditors in full by “refusing to maximize their tax-raising capacity”). 
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control board or by extending loans,110 and can act to mitigate the 
causes of municipal distress, such as suburbanization, by 
reforming the state tax structure.111 A state can dissolve a 
municipality in order to merge it into another112 and can appoint 
a receiver to impose fiscal discipline on a municipality.113   
Recognizing this superiority, each author’s view of the 
relationship between state intervention and Chapter 9 influenced 
his prescriptions for a superior system for the resolution of 
financial distress. For example, Gillette’s article explored the 
interaction between Chapter 9 and state intervention; in fact, he 
described his contribution to the literature as an explanation of 
how the two systems interact using principles of fiscal 
federalism.114 The interaction he described, however, assumed 
that the two systems run on parallel, rather than intersecting, 
tracks.115 After discussing a city’s motivations to choose one 
system over the other, Gillette ultimately suggested a grant of 
greater powers to the bankruptcy court that would mirror those 
that could be exercised by the state in order to prevent strategic 
uses of bankruptcy by municipalities.116 Strategic use, therefore, 
                                                                                                     
 110. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 310. 
 111. See Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 387–88 (explaining that a state 
can require suburban residents to bear some of a city’s tax burden). 
 112. See Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 76, at 1375–84 (offering a 
survey of state law designed to facilitate municipal dissolution and merger); 
McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 481, 485 (stating that “[m]unicipal 
corporations can be liquidated” and that “some states might choose to merge the 
dissolved city into surrounding jurisdictions”). 
 113. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 473 (noting the historical 
success that appointed receivers have had in “disciplining municipal budgets”). 
Laws providing for the appointment of receivers are highly controversial in part 
because they deprive the local electorate of their choice of elected officials, and 
they tend to affect cities with large minority populations. See Michelle Wilde 
Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers 
of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 582 (2012) [hereinafter 
Anderson, Radical Experimentation] (maintaining that receivers “can enflame 
antagonism between state and local actors” and “disempower a beleaguered 
local electorate”). 
 114. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 16, at 286. 
 115. See id. at 293–94 (discussing the effects of Chapter 9 on local 
municipalities without reference to state intervention). 
 116. See id. at 326 (explaining that municipal leaders would be less likely to 
threaten to file for Chapter 9 in order to extract state bailouts if they knew that 
the bankruptcy judge had the same power to impose resource adjustments that 
the state did). 
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is possible only because Chapter 9 lacks the debtor governance 
that a state can provide. According to Gillette, this problem can 
be remedied by giving the two systems similar debtor governance 
provisions.117  
In McConnell and Picker’s view, the mutual exclusivity of 
state oversight and bankruptcy meant that there was a 
governance vacuum that excluded coordination between the state 
intervention process and the federal bankruptcy process.118 They 
discussed several examples of state oversight that they 
characterized as successful.119 Their prescription was to allow for 
parallel systems, but to allow a state that was inclined to 
implement an intervention scheme to opt entirely out of 
Chapter 9. Their opt-out went further than the opt-out that 
already exists in the Code, however. They explained that the 
constitutional objections to state-imposed bankruptcy regimes 
might easily be overcome by amending the Code to permit the 
states to impose involuntary debt adjustments, thus allowing 
states to not only opt-out of the Code entirely, as they can now, 
but to provide the same benefits that the Code provides to their 
cities in doing so.120 McConnell and Picker believed that one 
benefit of a state-run bankruptcy regime would be that the state 
could commit its resources to the financial rehabilitation of a city 
as part of the process.121 
Writing after the Orange County bankruptcy, Frederick 
Tung provided a different perspective on Chapter 9 governance. 
Of the post-1990 municipal bankruptcy scholars, Tung saw the 
                                                                                                     
 117. See id. (“[T]he ideal remedy is to make the level of local officials’ 
authority inside and outside bankruptcy more similar.”).   
 118. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 479 (arguing that, because 
federal bankruptcy is an alternative rather than a supplement to state reform, 
“no one is in a position to coordinate state assistance”). 
 119. See id. at 473–74 (listing receiverships initiated in New York City, 
Chelsea, Massachusetts, and Ecorse, Michigan as “notable success[es]”). Twenty 
years later, however, some of these state intervention schemes have proven less 
successful than they had hoped. See infra notes 359–60 and accompanying text 
(discussing the mixed municipal recovery results reached under Pennsylvania’s 
receivership statute). 
 120. See id. at 479–80 (explaining that such a scheme would not violate the 
Contracts Clause if it were to operate only prospectively, because its terms 
would be incorporated into future contracts).   
 121. See id. at 479 (insisting that states could “lend [their] credit” or their 
“state resources” to distressed municipalities). 
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greatest role for the state in the Chapter 9 process. At the time 
Orange County filed for bankruptcy, California authorized its 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy free of any restrictions in 
addition to those imposed by the Bankruptcy Code.122 Tung 
recognized both that early cooperation between a city in financial 
trouble and its state is necessary, but that sometimes such 
cooperation, if it comes at all, comes too late to avert a financial 
disaster.123 Tung’s suggestions for California involved increased 
gubernatorial involvement in municipal bankruptcy by requiring 
the governor to approve all such bankruptcies.124 As I will explain 
below in Part V, California has notably declined the invitation to 
exercise governance over its cities in financial distress.125 
In a perfect world, a state could prevent and ameliorate the 
financial distress of its cities without resort to federal law. The 
world is not perfect, however. States are prohibited from 
imposing binding plans of adjustment on nonconsenting creditors 
by the Contracts Clause of the Constitution and by Supreme 
Court precedent.126 As a result, state-supervised municipal debt 
adjustment plans must win the consent of all creditors. Moreover, 
some states lack intervention programs;127 others may implement 
those programs only when a general-purpose municipality in that 
state falls into financial distress.128 As such, they may not provide 
the proactive monitoring assistance that prevents cities from 
falling into financial ruin.129 Even states that have intervention 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Tung, supra note 3, at 891–92 (discussing Sections 43739 and 
53760 of the California Code and concluding that they “provide fairly broad 
authorization for California municipal entities to file for bankruptcy”). 
 123. Id. at 907. 
 124. See id. at 921–23 (providing a menu of conditions that could be 
attached to such a filing depending on the needs of each city). 
 125. Infra Part V. 
 126. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (explaining the constitutional 
limitations placed on state power to affect unilateral adjustments of municipal 
debt). 
 127. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 9–10 (2013) [hereinafter PEW REPORT] (listing only nineteen 
states that have intervention programs). 
 128. See infra notes 338–51 and accompanying text (explaining how 
intervention programs in Rhode Island and Michigan were enacted reactively to 
deal with existing municipal distress). 
 129. See John C. Philo, Local Government Fiscal Emergencies and the 
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programs may find that such programs are not as effective as 
originally hoped.130  
The post-1990 authors expressed important concerns about 
Chapter 9. Their core concern is that Chapter 9 does not provide 
debtor governance that is sufficient to effect structural changes in 
a distressed city. Their perception that Chapter 9 has more of a 
fresh start purpose than a rehabilitative purpose magnifies this 
concern. In the next section, I will discuss the relationship 
between bankruptcy governance and bankruptcy goals, and 
assert that Chapter 9 allows appropriate governance over 
municipal debtors by inviting states to provide the missing 
governance.  
III. Bankruptcy’s Goal-Oriented Governance 
Bankruptcy governance is inextricably linked to bankruptcy 
goals. As a result, one cannot develop effective governance 
mechanisms in any chapter of the Code if that chapter’s goals are 
unclear.131 If the goals of a municipal bankruptcy chapter are 
unclear, then Chapter 9, when viewed as a freestanding 
municipal rehabilitation mechanism, appears to have a 
governance problem. When Chapter 9 acts alone, it can give a 
municipality only a fresh start. Yet the only other debtors who 
receive a bankruptcy fresh start are individuals, and the Code 
does not govern them in the way that it governs entities. A 
municipality is not an individual, however. Because a 
municipality is an entity that provides necessary and desirable 
                                                                                                     
Disenfranchisement of Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 82 
(2011) (explaining that only a handful of states have general legislation 
enabling financial oversight of distressed cities); cf. Kimhi, Solution, supra note 
16, at 385 (promoting a proactive supervision system that would not only help to 
rehabilitate distressed localities, but also “prevent local fiscal stress from 
becoming a crisis”). 
 130. See infra notes 350–53 and accompanying text (describing a number of 
efficacy and impact objections to state intervention programs). 
 131. See Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of 
Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 
104–05 (1998) (explaining, in the business reorganization context, that 
“governance questions are inextricably bound up in the broader policy question 
of what goals Chapter 11 should seek to promote”). 
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public services for its residents,132 it may require the kinds of 
external governance that can be exercised over a corporate debtor 
in bankruptcy. Yet a municipality is not analogous to a corporate 
entity; in every American state, a municipality is a subdivision of 
its state,133 and it is therefore not owned and controlled like a 
private business entity. 
Bankruptcy does not have one exclusive goal. Every 
bankruptcy case, regardless of the chapter under which it is filed, 
aims to resolve the claims of the debtor’s multiple competing 
creditors and relieve the debtor from its financial past.134 Beyond 
that, the bankruptcy goals for individuals and entities diverge. In 
this section, I discuss the different types of bankruptcy goals and 
governance in order to clarify the governance that Congress 
intended when it enacted a municipal bankruptcy chapter. 
A. Bankruptcy Governance over Individuals 
Consumer bankruptcy law aims to provide a fresh start to 
the honest but unfortunate debtor.135 An individual manages 
herself, and no mechanism, whether provided by bankruptcy law 
or by some other law, can replace the management of an 
individual. Bankruptcy’s governance controls over individuals, 
therefore, consist of mechanisms designed to ensure that only 
“worthy” debtors will receive bankruptcy relief.136 When an 
                                                                                                     
 132. Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 29 (1998); Clayton 
P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory 
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 968 (1991). 
 133. See SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 1.02 
(2d ed. 1997) (“It has been well recognized that constitutionally as well as 
historically, local entities are merely subdivisions of the state.”); see also Gerald 
E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1980) 
(explaining that a city has only those powers that are delegated to it by its state 
government). 
 134. TABB, supra note 2, § 1.1. 
 135. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that 
bankruptcy law “gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for 
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new 
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the 
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt”). 
 136. See, e.g., Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An 
Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Qualification for Bankruptcy Discharge, 62 ALB. 
L. REV. 467, 477 (1998) (describing the “debtor’s honesty in disclosing and 
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individual files for bankruptcy, these governance controls operate 
both to limit the type of relief,137 if any, for which the debtor is 
eligible and to deny relief to debtors who engage in some 
wrongdoing during the bankruptcy case.138 Opening bankruptcy 
only to worthy debtors does nothing, however, to ensure that the 
post-bankruptcy individual debtor is better managed than her 
pre-bankruptcy self.139 
One way in which the Code attempts to govern the post-
bankruptcy behavior of individual debtors is by barring repeat 
petitions. An individual cannot file for bankruptcy if she has been 
in bankruptcy within six months before filing her petition if the 
earlier petition was dismissed because of the debtor’s 
uncooperative behavior in the case.140 In addition, the Code 
denies discharge to individuals who file too frequently. An 
individual debtor will be denied a discharge if she has received 
one in another bankruptcy case filed within two to eight years 
before the second petition, depending on the chapter under which 
both the first and second bankruptcies were filed.141 
                                                                                                     
turning over assets, and general cooperation with the bankruptcy process” as 
constant themes in the evolution of the discharge); Margaret Howard, A Theory 
of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1052 (1987) 
(describing bankruptcy law as being “more accurately interpreted as a series of 
provisions reflecting ad hoc definitions of what is honest or worthy in particular 
situations”). 
 137. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012) (subjecting individual debtors to means 
testing and denying Chapter 7 relief to an individual deemed to have sufficient 
income to fund a Chapter 13 plan). 
 138. See id. § 727 (denying individual debtors a Chapter 7 discharge for 
misbehavior before or during the bankruptcy case). 
 139. See David A. Lander, Essay, A Snapshot of Two Systems That Are 
Trying to Help People in Financial Trouble, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161, 174 
(1999) (maintaining that bankruptcy does little to alter the “personal 
characteristics and life circumstances” that cause repeated insolvency). 
 140. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (prohibiting an individual from filing if she 
voluntarily dismissed the earlier case after a request for relief from the 
automatic stay). 
 141. See id. § 727(a)(8) (denying a Chapter 7 discharge to an individual who 
was granted a Chapter 7 or 11 discharge in a case commenced within eight 
years before the petition was filed); id. § 727(a)(9) (denying a discharge to an 
individual who received a Chapter 12 or 13 discharge in a case commenced 
within six years before the petition); id. § 1328(f) (denying Chapter 13 discharge 
to a debtor who has received a Chapter 13 discharge in a case filed within two 
years before the date of the petition or who has received a discharge under 
Chapters 7, 11, or 12 in a case filed within four years before the petition). 
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Bankruptcy governance over individuals is therefore 
exercised through access and discharge restrictions. These 
restrictions are the only viable restrictions; there is no other way 
for the Code to dictate individual behavior. Bankruptcy will give 
an individual debtor relief from her pre-bankruptcy financial 
woes, but only if the debtor manages her affairs in a way that is 
deemed acceptable under the Code.142 The access restrictions 
encourage the debtor to exercise good financial governance over 
herself because they limit the frequency with which an individual 
can receive bankruptcy relief. 
B. Bankruptcy Governance over Entities 
The Code itself provides governance controls over the 
individual debtor. As I will discuss in this section, although the 
judge in a Chapter 11 case has more governance powers over the 
case itself than she does in a Chapter 9 case, non-bankruptcy 
forces govern the structural rehabilitation of the debtor entity. 
Unlike an individual debtor, who is governed only by herself, an 
entity is governed by a number of individuals whose behavior is 
influenced by the contracts the entity has entered into, the 
market in which the entity operates, and laws that impose 
fiduciary duties on entity actors.143 Bankruptcy law affects these 
elements of corporate governance when they conflict with 
bankruptcy goals.144 The debtor controls included in Chapter 11 
therefore provide a bankruptcy substitute for these market and 
contractual controls that affect corporate governance outside of 
bankruptcy.145 
The goal of business bankruptcy law is to maximize the value 
of an entity for its creditors and other parties affected by the 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Coulson, supra note 136, at 518–19 (identifying values like 
“orderliness, morality and respect” on which “an open credit economy depends” 
as the foundations of consumer bankruptcy). 
 143. See Frost, supra note 131, at 110 (describing the conceptual framework 
of the corporate governance structure). 
 144. See id. at 112–13 (noting that the “automatic stay deprives creditors of 
their contractual controls over managers” and that market discipline is 
irrelevant when managers are fighting for the very survival of their business). 
 145. See id. at 113 (explaining that these Chapter 11 controls substitute for 
market and contractual governance). 
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entity’s operations. A business entity that has no chance of 
survival will liquidate, either in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, and an 
entity that can survive will reorganize under Chapter 11, on the 
theory that an entity is worth more to its creditors as a going 
concern than it is in a piecemeal liquidation.146 Underlying 
corporate bankruptcy is the theory that a corporation can be 
reorganized to maximize its going-concern value for the benefit of 
its creditors, and if such reorganization is impossible, the 
corporate assets can be liquidated and distributed to the entity’s 
creditors.147 
The court and the debtor’s creditors have several powers in 
Chapter 11 that they lack in Chapter 9. These powers further the 
goal of maximizing the value of the business debtor’s assets. 
Bankruptcy law does not mandate the results of a successful 
Chapter 11; it facilitates them.148 In the paradigmatic 
Chapter 11, creditors receive shares of the reorganized 
corporation in exchange for their claims,149 but the Code does not 
require this result. Likewise, a plan can provide for the merger or 
dissolution of the debtor corporation, but again, the Code does not 
require any structural change.150 If internal corporate governance 
                                                                                                     
 146. See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN 
BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (4th ed. 2012) (explaining that 
reorganization is desirable based on the premise that preserving the entity’s 
going concern value is better for society than liquidating the entity); Elizabeth 
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 
350 (1993) (explaining the goals of business bankruptcy). 
 147. See Warren, supra note 146, at 350 (outlining the economic rationale 
underlying the methods employed by the Code to preserve value in a failing 
company).   
 148. See Levitin, supra note 16, at 1445 (explaining that all bankruptcy can 
do to help a firm whose business is the sale of “whale oil, corset stays, bustles, 
flash bulbs, slide rules [or] floppy disks” is to provide it with an orderly way to 
liquidate its assets and a “dignified funeral”). 
 149. See Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: 
Securities Law, Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 979, 1013–14 (2008) (explaining how Chapter 11 facilitates 
changes in corporate structure through plan confirmation and that the Code 
does not mandate any particular new control structure). 
 150. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (2012) (permitting a plan to include 
“merger or consolidation of the debtor” without mandating that such steps must 
be taken). The fact that these structural changes are largely left in the debtor’s 
hands has led over the years to calls for enhanced judicial controls in Chapter 
11 such as the mandatory appointment of a trustee or examiner, the reduction 
in time during which the debtor must propose a plan of reorganization, and an 
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can result in a successful going concern, the end result of a 
Chapter 11 will not be a sale of the business. If it cannot, the 
judge will honor a request to sell the assets to the person who can 
best maximize their value. Therefore, creditors in Chapter 11 can 
object to a debtor’s sale of its property,151 and they may propose 
their own plan of reorganization if the debtor does not do so 
within a prescribed time period.152  
A major concern of the post-1990 municipal bankruptcy 
authors was the inability of the court to replace a municipality’s 
management in Chapter 9.153 In Chapter 11, a court may do so by 
appointing a trustee, but courts do so infrequently. Although a 
party in interest can ask the court to appoint a trustee in a 
Chapter 11 case and the court must do so if it finds that the 
debtor’s management has acted in a way that is fraudulent, 
dishonest, or incompetent, or that it has grossly mismanaged the 
debtor’s affairs,154 such an appointment is considered an 
“extreme,” not a routine, remedy.155 Chapter 11, both by statute 
and in practice, embodies a presumption that existing 
management will remain in control of the debtor. The debtor can, 
at least initially, remain in control of its operations, use and sell 
property in the ordinary course of its business, and retain the 
exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.156 Even when 
                                                                                                     
early determination of plan feasibility. See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The 
Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 822–61 (1993) [hereinafter Tabb, The 
Future] (weighing the merits of twelve reform proposals, including trustee 
appointment, expedited stay relief, and required threshold feasibility findings). 
 151. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (requiring court review of a disposition in property 
by the bankruptcy estate when a creditor objects after having received notice of 
the pending disposition). 
 152. See id. § 1121(c) (allowing a number of creditors to file a plan of 
adjustment when certain conditions are met). 
 153. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (summarizing McConnell 
and Picker’s argument that the “fresh start” goal implied by Chapter 9’s refusal 
to allow for removal of municipal leadership renders Chapter 9 ineffective in 
dealing with municipal insolvency). 
 154. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (listing the conditions for court-ordered 
appointment of a trustee). 
 155. See In re William A. Smith Const. Co., Inc., 77 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1987) (“[T]he appointment of a trustee is an extraordinary remedy . . . 
which should not be made lightly.”). See generally Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 KAN. L. REV. 83, 96 (2007). 
 156. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rozensweig, The Untenable Case for 
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1045 n.9 (1992) (compiling a list of Bankruptcy 
GOALS AND GOVERNANCE 435 
a court appoints a trustee in a Chapter 11 case, the trustee is 
usually appointed not to manage the business but to sell the 
business.157 Some courts have more specifically tailored the 
trustee remedy to the corporate governance problems of the 
debtor corporation by appointing a trustee to work with, rather 
than replace, corporate management when the skills of the 
corporate managers are necessary to the continued viability of 
the enterprise, despite the wrongdoing that led to the trustee 
appointment.158 
This balance that leaves governance powers in the 
management of the debtor entity in most cases furthers the goals 
that Congress had in mind when it enacted Chapter 11. A policy 
of encouraging financially stressed entities to submit to a 
bankruptcy proceeding while their operations could be salvaged 
drove the enactment of Chapter 11 in 1978.159 Chapter 11 
changed prior corporate bankruptcy practice. Under the 
Bankruptcy Act, Chapter X, the reorganization chapter for large 
public companies, required that the court appoint a trustee.160 
Congress favored control by corporate management, and made a 
choice, in enacting Chapter 11, to leave corporate control in 
management hands.161 Congress made this decision to leave 
control in management hands to further the rehabilitative policy 
                                                                                                     
Code provisions that allow for continued debtor management); Warren, supra 
note 146, at 372 (compiling a similar list). 
 157. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 72 (1992) (explaining that corporate 
management remains in control in a Chapter 11 so that the corporation can 
continue to operate and that a trustee will not be appointed to operate a 
business with which she is not familiar).  
 158. See Alces, supra note 155, at 106–07 (giving examples of cases in which 
the courts appointed a trustee to supervise the financial management of the 
debtors but allowed existing managers to stay in their positions because of their 
business development or creative talents). 
 159. See Warren, supra note 146, at 371–72 (explaining that both debtors 
and creditors believed that the reorganization provisions under the 1898 Act 
were ineffective, debtors because they did not trust that they could save their 
businesses in bankruptcy and creditors because they believed that “the system 
dissipated assets and delayed payouts unnecessarily”). 
 160. See Alces, supra note 155, at 91–92 (explaining bankruptcy governance 
under the Bankruptcy Act). 
 161. John Wm. Butler, Jr., Chris L. Dickerson, & Stephen S. Neuman, 
Preserving State Corporate Governance Law in Chapter 11: Maximizing Value 
Through Traditional Fiduciaries, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 337, 337 (2010). 
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behind Chapter 11. If the management remained in control, 
stockholders, creditors, and the community would fare better 
than they would if the business were liquidated.162  
Even if bankruptcy serves to reorganize a large corporate 
debtor efficiently, many bemoan the lack of governance controls 
over small business entities. Small businesses make up the bulk, 
in number, of Chapter 11 filings, yet many believe that 
Chapter 11 is not effective with respect to small businesses.163 
This criticism illustrates that the Chapter 11 governance 
paradigm is one specifically tailored to one type of business: the 
large business. It does not mean, however, that a rehabilitation 
bankruptcy chapter cannot work for other entities. Other types of 
entities may be successfully rehabilitated using the bankruptcy 
process if the rehabilitation process includes governance 
provisions appropriate to the debtor.164 
                                                                                                     
 162. See Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small 
Business in Bankruptcy, 4 J. SM. & EMERGING BUS. L. 181, 226 (2000) (arguing 
that the Chapter 11 structure is ultimately designed to benefit the “community 
as a whole”). The shift in practice from a mandatory trustee to presumed debtor 
control has led to decades of debate about whether Chapter 11 gives creditors 
too little control over the reorganization process. See, e.g., Bradley & 
Rozensweig, supra note 156, at 1088–89 (1992) (concluding that corporate 
managers use Chapter 11 as a shield from unwelcome management interference 
by creditors); Frost, supra note 131, at 155–56 (concluding that although 
Chapter 11 provides an oversight structure that could remedy an insolvent 
corporation’s governance problems, the reality tells a different story); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 271–73 (1983) (concluding, 
based on an empirical study of bankruptcy filings in the Western District of 
Missouri, that the Code’s mechanisms designed to improve or replace poor 
debtor management did not work as intended); Tabb, The Future, supra note 
150, at 792–802 (surveying the criticisms of Chapter 11 and the suggestions for 
improvement). 
 163. See Blum, supra note 162, at 196–201 (arguing that the typical 
characteristics of failed small businesses impede quick and successful 
reorganization under Chapter 11); Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The 
Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743, 788 (2005) 
(explaining the mismatch between existing bankruptcy laws and the needs of 
the entrepreneur with a failing business); Hon. A. Thomas Small, If You Fix It, 
They Will Come: A New Playing Field for Small Business Bankruptcies, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 981, 981 (2005) (“Chapter 11 contains too many obstacles, and the 
reorganization of small businesses under Chapter 11 is simply too difficult for 
many businesses.”).  
 164. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, 78 MO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (suggesting a modified view of Chapter 11 to account for the 
unique governance characteristics of religious institutions); Margaret E. 
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C. Bankruptcy Governance over Municipalities 
Viewed in the context of bankruptcy goals and governance, 
the absence of many debtor controls from Chapter 9 makes sense. 
A perceived problem with Chapter 9’s control allocation is that it 
removes creditor control without providing a substitute restraint 
on the debtor.165 That restraint cannot be imposed by the 
bankruptcy court, both because of constitutional considerations 
and because of the clear statement in Chapter 9 that the 
bankruptcy court may not interfere with the debtor 
municipality’s “political or governmental powers,” its “property or 
revenues,” or its “use or enjoyment of [its] income-producing 
property.”166  
Creditors of a municipality are likewise unable to impose 
debtor restraints in bankruptcy. One cannot talk about the value 
of a municipality to creditors in the same way as one discusses 
the value of an entity to creditors.167 Creditors can force an entity 
to liquidate, either piecemeal as a result of state law creditor 
remedies that allow creditors to seize private assets, or through 
the bankruptcy process.168 There is no comparable liquidation 
scheme for municipalities.169 Most municipal assets are immune 
                                                                                                     
Juliano, Comment, Stalemate: The Need for Limitations on Regulatory Deference 
in Electric Bankruptcies, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 248–50 (2003) (arguing that the 
rehabilitative goals of the bankruptcy code are both appropriate and necessary 
in the electric utility context, provided that additional governance provisions are 
added to procedurally and substantively constrain electric utility regulators).   
 165. See, e.g., Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 355–59 (summarizing the 
gaps between creditor controls in Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 and noting that 
Chapter 9 provides municipalities with “relatively easy debt relief” because a 
“municipality has greater powers than a regular corporate debtor does”).   
 166. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (implying that 
powers to interfere with municipal political affairs are reserved to the states 
because the Constitution does not delegate such powers to the federal 
government). 
 167. See Kimhi, Solution, supra note 16, at 370–72 (explaining that creditors 
who would otherwise pursue common pool debtor assets in corporate bankruptcy 
are barred from doing so in municipal bankruptcy because of state law and 
sovereignty issues). 
 168. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (explaining how and why 
the Bankruptcy Code endorses liquidation in the Chapter 11 context).   
 169. See In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1991) (“A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to satisfy its creditors 
totally and finally.” (citation omitted)). 
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from creditor process outside of bankruptcy;170 therefore, giving 
creditors the power to force such sales inside of bankruptcy would 
be counter to the general bankruptcy policy that respects state 
law property rights “unless some federal interest requires a 
different result.”171 The value of a municipality to its creditors is 
its ability to repay those creditors.  
Because municipalities are political instrumentalities, 
elected officials manage their functions, and therefore creditors 
have no ability to replace management, either inside or outside of 
bankruptcy. A municipality is not a profit-making enterprise that 
can be dismantled and distributed if it ceases to be successful; 
rather, it exists to provide “essential governmental services.”172 It 
does not have shareholders who, as residual owners, bear the risk 
of its failure. Instead, a municipality has citizens who depend on 
its services. As a result, the Code provisions that provide debtor 
governance over a dysfunctional corporate entity would be 
inappropriate in a municipal context. Allowing a bankruptcy 
court to replace municipal management with a trustee would not 
only give creditors and other parties in interest far more rights in 
bankruptcy than they would have outside of bankruptcy but 
would fall afoul of the Tenth Amendment.173 
In some respects, municipal bankruptcy shares goals with 
business bankruptcy, and where the two types of bankruptcy 
share goals, they also share governance provisions. Bankruptcy 
law gives corporate managers the breathing room they need to 
make organizational decisions174 and some of the tools necessary 
to do so, such as the power to assume or reject executory 
contracts.175 A municipal debtor likewise receives these 
bankruptcy benefits.176 Bankruptcy also allows both categories of 
                                                                                                     
 170. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 429–34 (explaining that 
municipal assets are immune from creditor process). 
 171. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 172. Dubrow, supra note 3, at 546. 
 173. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states all powers not 
delegated to Congress by the Constitution). 
 174. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (providing an automatic stay of actions to 
collect debts from the debtor and the debtor’s property). 
 175. See id. § 365 (allowing the manager of the bankrupt entity to “assume 
or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor”). 
 176. See id. § 901 (incorporating 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 365). 
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debtors to impose a plan of debt restructuring on nonconsenting 
creditors.177 As a result, Chapter 9 borrows plan confirmation 
provisions from Chapter 11.178 
Because corporate reorganization implies a transfer of assets 
to the persons best able to maximize their value, the goal of 
corporate reorganization does not seem to apply well to municipal 
bankruptcy. Chapter 9, without state intervention in the debtor 
municipality’s affairs, can provide only debt relief and a fresh 
start. Bankruptcy law therefore governs municipal debtors in a 
manner that is closer to individual governance than entity 
governance and leaves rehabilitative governance to state law. 
Just as the Code manages an individual debtor’s behavior 
through its entry and discharge rules, it governs municipal 
debtors primarily through its entry rules.179 If the state wants to 
participate in the Chapter 9 case, it can do so by conditioning its 
Chapter 9 authorization on the debtor’s participation in a state 
oversight program.180 If the state does not want to do so, the court 
can ensure that only worthy municipalities—those that are 
insolvent and that have negotiated in good faith with their 
creditors—can file.181 
The proponents of the original municipal bankruptcy 
legislation had no intention of creating a governance vacuum. 
Instead, they recognized that a federal procedure was necessary 
only to provide the relief that a state alone could not provide to a 
municipal debtor.182 They did not ignore organizational 
governance over the debtor; rather, they designed the federal 
                                                                                                     
 177. See id. § 1129(b)(1) (providing for cramdown plans); id. § 901 
(incorporating § 1129(b)(1)). 
 178. As I explain below, however, it remains unclear how these provisions 
will work in a Chapter 9. Infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.  
 179. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (establishing criteria for qualification as a 
debtor under Chapter 9). 
 180. See id. § 109(c)(2) (noting that a municipal debtor qualifies for Chapter 
9 only if it is “specifically authorized” as a municipality, or it qualifies under 
state law). 
 181. See id. § 109(c)(5) (requiring that municipalities seeking to file under 
Chapter 9 engage, when possible, in good faith negotiations with creditors or 
make agreements on amounts owed). 
 182. See A.M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 
351–52 (1936) (noting that state law alone was “inadequate” because the states 
could not compel creditors to accept agreements). 
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bankruptcy law to provide the federal benefits of debt relief as a 
complement to state-led efforts to rehabilitate municipalities.183 
In the next section, I will explain that history to show how 
Congress intended that municipal financial relief be provided by 
a system integrating state governance over municipalities with 
federal debt relief. 
IV. A History of Chapter 9 from a Governance Perspective 
A. Why Municipal Bankruptcy? 
In 1934, Congress enacted the predecessor statute to today’s 
Chapter 9 in emergency legislation passed as the United States 
was recovering from the Great Depression.184 Thousands of 
municipalities defaulted on their debt obligations during the 
Depression,185 and in 1933, about seven percent of the municipal 
debt outstanding was in default.186 Although municipalities 
started to issue bonds in the early 1800s,187 in the years 
                                                                                                     
 183. See id. at 351–53 (discussing the complementarity between state and 
federal legislation). 
 184. In 1934, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to include 
Chapter IX, titled Provisions for the Emergency Temporary Aid of Insolvent 
Public Debtors and to Preserve the Assets Thereof and for Other Related 
Purposes. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012)), 
invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 
U.S. 513 (1936). In Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, the 
Supreme Court ruled the original Municipal Bankruptcy Act to be 
unconstitutional and Congress replaced it in 1937. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531–32. 
The Court upheld the 1937 Act in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–52 
(1938). Congress made municipal bankruptcy law a permanent part of 
bankruptcy law in 1946. See Kenneth N. Klee, Introduction, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 
221, 221 (2012) (explaining the early federal legislation).    
 185. See Philo, supra note 129, at 80 (explaining that 4,770 cities defaulted 
on their debt during the Great Depression). 
 186. See Harold Gill Reuschlein, Municipal Debt Readjustment: Present 
Relief and Future Policy, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 365 (1938) (reporting that “out of 
$14,000,000,000 invested in securities of local state governmental units, 
$1,000,000,000 were reported to be in default”). 
 187. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 30 (stating that although the exact 
date of the first municipal bond is unknown, New York City began to issue 
bonds in about 1812). 
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preceding the Depression, municipal securities were more widely 
distributed among investors than they had ever been.188 
The distribution of municipal securities among a wide range 
of investors increased the need for federal involvement in the 
resolution of municipal financial distress for two reasons. First, 
because many types of investors held such securities, the effect of 
a municipal default would be felt throughout the nation’s 
economy.189 Second, creditors began to appreciate the benefits of a 
collective proceeding to collect municipal debts over the 
uncontrolled use of lawsuits by creditors seeking to be the first to 
collect their claims.190 
Municipal finance experts in the 1930s recognized that 
traditional creditor remedies were ineffective to deal with the 
problem of municipal defaults. The nature of a municipality as a 
public service provider has several debt collection ramifications. 
The first is that a municipality cannot be liquidated in the 
traditional sense. A state might have a mechanism by which to 
dissolve and consolidate municipalities, but that is not a remedy 
that creditors can pursue.191 While creditors of private entities 
can seize and sell the assets of the defaulting entity to satisfy 
their claims through processes such as levy and execution,192 
creditors of a municipality are barred from seizing municipal 
assets because municipalities are deemed to hold their assets 
devoted to public use in trust for their citizens.193 Because a 
                                                                                                     
 188. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 365 n.5 (setting forth the 
distribution of municipal and state bonds among individuals, banks, insurance 
companies and other entities in December 1932). 
 189. See id. at 365 (noting that “the spread of holdings of municipal 
securities” results in widespread effects of economic collapse). 
 190. See Edward J. Dimock, Legal Problems of Financially Embarrassed 
Municipalities, 22 VA. L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1935) [hereinafter Dimock, Legal 
Problems] (comparing the creditors of private corporations to those of 
municipalities and explaining that the need of corporate creditors for a collective 
proceeding led to the development of the equity receivership). 
 191. See id. at 1376 (noting that municipalities can be dissolved by the state, 
local initiative, consent, or inactivity). 
 192. See 1 HON. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS § 6:53 (Nov. 2012) (discussing the postjudgment use of the writ of 
execution). 
 193. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 367 (discussing the inability of 
creditors to obtain properties used for “public purpose”); see also Jeff B. 
Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public 
442 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403 (2014) 
municipality’s assets are often immune from creditor process, 
they are worthless to the creditors of the municipality.194 A 
municipality’s taxing power is valuable to creditors, but creditors 
cannot assume control over that power.195  
In the 1930s, as now, the only viable collection remedy 
against a municipality was the mandamus action. Creditors 
brought mandamus actions against municipalities to force the 
responsible municipal officers to either pay the creditor’s claim 
out of tax collections or to levy a sufficient tax to pay the 
creditor’s judgment.196 These actions had the potential to place 
the municipality’s essential services in peril.197 Although the 
mandamus remedy was available to creditors, it was effective 
mainly as a threat device; sometimes the officers subject to the 
mandamus action would leave the jurisdiction in order to avoid 
the writ or allow themselves to be jailed for contempt of court.198 
The benefit of mandamus was therefore primarily in its value as 
a catalyst to negotiation and settlement among the municipality 
and its creditors.199 Even that benefit was limited; a court would 
                                                                                                     
Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 28, 28–30 (1933) (discussing statutes and case 
law that protected municipal assets from seizure by creditors). 
 194. See City of Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 495, 595 (1861) (explaining that 
the seizure of city assets could cause great harm to a city’s residents); Buell v. 
Arnold, 102 N.W. 338, 339 (Wisc. 1905) (explaining that the property of 
municipal corporations cannot be seized or sold upon execution); McConnell & 
Picker, supra note 3, at 429–34 (explaining laws prohibiting the seizure of 
municipal assets). 
 195. See Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 40 (recognizing that 
“we are unwilling in this country to permit the creditors to determine what shall 
be spent for those municipal services and what shall be applied upon their 
debts”).   
 196. See Fordham, supra note 193, at 39–47 (explaining the different types 
of mandamus actions). 
 197. See Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 40–41 (discussing the 
high costs of litigation in mandamus actions and the resulting interference with 
competent municipal governance).   
 198. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 511 
(1942) (discussing the lengths to which municipal officers would go to avoid 
mandamus); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 367 n.19 (“One Kansas county chose 
its officials upon condition that they should remain in hiding and appear in the 
jurisdiction to transact the county’s business only by night.”). 
 199. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 368 (discussing the ineffectiveness of 
the mandamus remedy and the various types of negotiated agreements between 
municipalities and creditors). 
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refuse to issue an order of mandamus if the failure to pay debts 
was due to the inability to do so rather than the unwillingness to 
do so, or if the municipality had already reached its constitutional 
or statutory tax limits.200 
In the 1930s, lawyers recognized that they could look to the 
states, the federal government, or both for a solution to the 
problem of widespread municipal defaults. Both sovereigns were 
limited in their ability to solve the problem. A state could actively 
supervise the finances of its municipalities either by imposing a 
receivership201 or by establishing a municipal finance 
commission. 202 A receiver or commission could actively manage a 
city’s budget and supervise its borrowing.203 As one commentator 
at the time explained, the state could provide “the very kind of 
active, aggressive leadership in rehabilitating the finances of an 
insolvent [municipality] that is needed.”204 
Although the states could impose fiscal discipline on their 
municipalities, their ability to impose a plan of composition on 
dissenting creditors was constitutionally suspect for two reasons. 
The first was the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, which 
prohibits states from “passing any Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts.”205 The Contracts Clause therefore prohibits the 
states from passing laws that would force a creditor to accept less 
than what it is owed on a claim without that creditor’s consent. 
Although the Contracts Clause does not prohibit a state from 
passing a law prospectively impairing contracts because all 
contracts executed after the enactment of such a law would 
                                                                                                     
 200. See Comment, Administration of Municipal Credit, 43 YALE L.J. 924, 
963–64 (1934) (noting that courts cannot enforce a municipality to gather more 
revenue to pay creditors); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 368 (discussing the 
extreme difficulties creditors faced when trying to collect payment from debtor 
municipalities). 
 201. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 352 (explaining the benefits and 
limitations of a receivership). 
 202. See Edward J. Dimock, Progress in Solving Municipal Insolvency 
Problems, 27 VA. L. REV. 193, 194–96 (1940) [hereinafter Dimock, Progress] 
(discussing the New Jersey Municipal Finance Commission); Reuschlein, supra 
note 186, at 368 (discussing the general powers of such commissions).   
 203. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (discussing the broad reach of 
state receivership programs). 
 204. Id. 
 205. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, 
at 427–29 (explaining the history of the Chapter 9). 
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incorporate such an impairment,206 municipalities were in crisis 
in the 1930s and needed a mechanism to adjust their existing 
debts, not the obligations that they would incur in the future.207  
Even a state proceeding that would operate only 
prospectively was suspect. A state proceeding could relieve a 
debtor municipality from its obligations only if it could bind all of 
the municipality’s creditors, wherever located. Yet a long line of 
cases beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ogden v. 
Saunders208 had held that a discharge from debt granted 
pursuant to one state’s laws could not be enforced against a 
creditor from another state who did not participate in the 
discharge proceeding.209 As a result, a collective proceeding under 
state law would be effective to bind only those out-of-state 
creditors who voluntarily participated in the proceeding. 
A federal collective proceeding to resolve municipal financial 
distress was not free from constitutional objections, however. 
Under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress has the power to pass 
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States.”210 Commentators expressed some skepticism as to 
whether a federal process to adjust the debts of a municipality 
was within the purview of the Bankruptcy Clause, positing that 
the “subject of bankruptcies” was limited to “proceedings 
contemplating surrender of the debtor’s assets for distribution to 
his creditors and discharge of the debtor.”211 Because a 
municipality’s assets cannot be forcibly distributed to its 
creditors, it was possible that a municipal debt adjustment 
                                                                                                     
 206. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 480 (discussing constitutional 
limits on state insolvency legislation).  
 207. See Administration of Municipal Credit, supra note 200, at 969–70 
(discussing the emergence of the Sumners Bill and the national economic 
emergency). 
 208. 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
 209. See, e.g., Cook v. Moffat & Curtis, 46 U.S. 295, 309 (1847) (finding that 
a state cannot pass a law affecting contracts beyond its territory); Hawley v. 
Hunt, 27 Iowa 303, 314 (1869) (concluding that “if the creditor is a non-resident 
of the State, a discharge under a State law cannot affect him unless he 
voluntarily becomes a party to the proceeding”); Hornick, More & Porterfield v. 
Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Bank, 227 N.W. 375, 379 (S.D. 1929) (stressing that Ogden 
limits “the power of states to act adversely upon the rights of citizens of other 
states”). 
 210. U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl.4.  
 211. Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 371 n.35. 
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statute was not within the subject of bankruptcies.212 This view of 
the Bankruptcy Clause was not limited to its extension to 
municipal insolvency; Congress also added railroad 
reorganizations and corporate reorganizations to the bankruptcy 
laws in the 1930s213 and its power to do so was similarly 
questioned.214 One objection to the extension of the federal 
bankruptcy to corporate and railroad reorganizations was that 
the power to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies did not 
include the power to adjust the obligations of entities that were 
merely insolvent in the sense that they could not meet their 
obligations but did not meet the common law definition of 
bankrupt.215 
Given the expansion of the term “bankruptcy” from its 
original eighteenth century meaning, the Bankruptcy Clause 
objection to a federal law to resolve municipal financial distress 
was fairly weak. A much more serious objection to extending 
Congress’ bankruptcy power to municipalities was rooted in the 
Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution 
reserves to the states all powers not granted to the federal 
government nor prohibited to the states by the Constitution.216 
When a private entity files for bankruptcy, all of its property 
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, over which the court has 
some control.217 Because a federal proceeding could intrude on a 
                                                                                                     
 212. See Asa G. Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy Jurisdiction be Extended to 
Include Municipalities and Other Taxable Subdivisions?, 19 A.B.A. J. 637, 637–
38 (1933) (“No one ever intended to give to Congress power to extend the 
bankruptcy law to municipalities . . . .”). For a contrary view at the time, see 
Dimock, Legal Problems supra note 190, at 53 (“Congress in the exercise of its 
bankruptcy power is not confined to giving to the federal courts the power to 
make adjudications and to grant discharges.”). 
 213. See Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and 
Wrong About Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 837–38 (1994) (discussing the 
1933 and 1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). 
 214. See James R. Morford, Federal Legislation for Corporate 
Reorganizations: A Negative View, 19 A.B.A. J. 702, 704 (1933) (discussing the 
constitutionality of the expansion of the federal bankruptcy laws to railroad 
corporations). 
 215. Albert K. Stebbins, Constitutionality of the Recent Amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Law, 17 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 171–73 (1933); Morford, supra note 214, 
at 704. 
 216. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 217. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (limiting the power of the debtor to use 
property of the estate without the court’s approval); id. § 541 (providing that 
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state’s power to govern its cities, some feared that a bankruptcy 
chapter for municipalities would violate the Tenth 
Amendment.218  
The constitutional restrictions on both the state and federal 
powers to resolve a municipal debt crisis that had the potential to 
contaminate the national economy led to calls for a combination 
of state and federal action. States could provide active fiscal 
oversight, but could not impose binding debt adjustments on 
nonconsenting creditors. Federal legislation could force debt 
reductions on creditors but could not provide the active fiscal 
guidance that was needed to ensure that a municipality could 
both resolve its current problems and avoid future problems.219 In 
the 1930s, therefore, experts in municipal finance recognized a 
need for a combination of federal and state action to resolve a 
municipal debt crisis that had the potential to contaminate the 
economy of the entire country.220 Those experts recognized that 
cooperative action could overcome the legal limitations placed on 
each sovereign.221 As a result, they designed the original 
bankruptcy legislation to be just one component of their desired 
mechanism for resolving the financial crisis then facing American 
municipalities. 
B. The 1930s Wish List and Resulting Statutes 
Chapter IX, the original municipal bankruptcy statute, 
allowed any municipality or any other political subdivision of a 
                                                                                                     
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, an estate is created consisting of all 
interests of the debtor in property at the time the petition is filed). 
 218. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 427 (discussing the role of 
federalism in the development of bankruptcy laws). 
 219. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 385 (recognizing municipal debt 
crisis would not be resolved if debt readjustment was not accompanied by state 
plans controlling local credit). 
 220. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (noting that “there is a definite 
need for concurrent action by both the federal and state governments”). 
 221. See, e.g., id. (urging complementary measures because each sovereign 
could “supply the major limitation in the other”); Administration of Municipal 
Credit, supra note 200, at 1005 (recognizing that federal legislation and “careful 
state supervision of local credit are both essential to proper solution of the vital 
and complex problem presented by . . . municipal insolvencies”). 
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state to file a voluntary petition for readjustment of its debts.222 
Congress had a modest goal, that of solving the holdout problem, 
in passing the legislation.223 The Act required the debtor 
municipality to prepare and acquire consent from a prescribed 
number of creditors to the plan of adjustment before filing for 
bankruptcy.224 Although the Act contained no automatic stay of 
litigation against the municipality,225 the court could order a stay 
of actions both against the municipality and against its officers 
who might be the targets of a mandamus action.226 The court 
could approve a plan upon the vote of the necessary number of 
creditors, so long as the plan was “fair, equitable, and for the best 
interests of creditors.”227 A confirmed plan would bind all 
creditors, including those who did not accept the plan.228 The law 
explicitly rejected any limits on the power of states to control 
their municipalities and also allowed the states to decide whether 
their municipalities could take advantage of its provisions.229  
Two years later, the Supreme Court struck down the 1934 
Act as unconstitutional. In Ashton v. Cameron County Water 
                                                                                                     
 222. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798 (codified 
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water 
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 223. See Wylie Kilpatrick, Federal Regulation of Local Debt, 26 NAT’L MUN. 
REV. 283, 288 (1937) (arguing that the municipal bankruptcy act was not a well-
balanced approach to the municipal debt problem precisely because of its modest 
goal in binding dissenting creditors to a plan of adjustment). 
 224. See Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. 
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (requiring, as a 
prerequisite to filing, the acceptance of the plan by the holders of at least 30% of 
the debt of drainage, irrigation, reclamation and levee districts and 51% of the 
debt of all other taxing authorities). 
 225. At the time, no bankruptcy petition under any chapter of the 1898 Act 
imposed an automatic stay of all actions against the debtor and the debtor’s 
property. The first automatic stay was included in farm-debtor relief legislation 
in 1933. See Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 175, 179 (1978) (explaining the history of the automatic stay). 
 226. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(c)(9), 48 Stat. 798 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. 
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 227. Id. § 80 (d), (e). 
 228. Id. § 80(f). 
 229. Id. § 80(k). 
448 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403 (2014) 
Improvement District,230 the Court found the original municipal 
bankruptcy legislation to be “inconsistent with the idea of 
sovereignty.”231 The fact that states retained the power to prevent 
their municipalities from filing for bankruptcy did not remedy the 
Act’s constitutional infirmities, for the Court stressed that 
“neither consent nor submission by the States can enlarge the 
power of Congress.”232 In the Court’s view, allowing the federal 
courts to interfere with the obligations of states and their 
political subdivisions was impermissible, even with state 
consent.233 
During the short life of Chapter IX, 88 municipalities filed for 
bankruptcy, 24 of which were cities, towns, or counties.234 One 
writer on municipal finance, A.M. Hillhouse, observed that the 
mere existence of the legislation alleviated the problem of holdout 
creditors because the knowledge that a municipality might resort 
to a bankruptcy filing to force a plan on such creditors was 
enough to bring recalcitrant creditors to the bargaining table.235 
The utility of the Act as a vehicle for cooperation between a state 
and the federal court went untested, however. One of the many 
petitions pending at the time of the Ashton opinion was that of 
North Bergen, New Jersey.236 By the time North Bergen filed for 
bankruptcy in 1936, the New Jersey Municipal Finance 
Commission had assumed control over the township’s fiscal 
affairs.237 Most commentators at the time called for 
complementary state and federal legislation to address municipal 
financial distress; to them, North Bergen could have been an 
ideal case.238 Had the case been allowed to proceed, it might have 
provided some guidance on questions regarding the relationship 
between the federal court and the state oversight commission as 
                                                                                                     
 230. 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 231. Id. at 531. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See id. (noting that state sovereignty “cannot be surrendered”). 
 234. HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 387–88. 
 235. Id. at 388–89. 
 236. Id. at 392. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  
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well as the nature of the commission’s control both during and 
after the case.239 
Both before Congress passed the first municipal 
bankruptcy act and after the Court held it to be 
unconstitutional, commentators suggested components of an 
ideal system to resolve the municipal debt crisis. An early 
commentator on municipal insolvency, Edward J. Dimock,240 
set forth the essential elements of any comprehensive scheme 
to alleviate municipal financial distress.241 He analogized his 
ideal municipal debt resolution process to the equity 
receivership that had been developed in the late nineteenth 
century to restructure financially troubled railroads during a 
period in which there was no uniform federal bankruptcy 
statute.242 Dimock’s list of elements included: outside control of 
the insolvent debtor’s finances,243 concerted action by all 
creditors, accompanied by a stay of litigation to secure a 
“period of peace” to develop and evaluate a plan of debt 
adjustment,244 and a settlement binding on all creditors.245 
Dimock and others recognized that both state and federal 
action were needed for a well-balanced approach to the 
municipal debt problem. Some federal action was clearly 
necessary, whether it be by granting full faith and credit to 
state debt adjustment proceedings or by extending Congress’s 
bankruptcy power to municipalities.246 The federal power was 
                                                                                                     
 239. Id.   
 240. Edward Dimock was a leading bond lawyer and bar leader who later 
became a judge on the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York. Edward J. Dimock Appointed to Federal Bench, 37 A.B.A. J. 674, 674 
(1951). 
 241. See Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 43–44 (noting that the 
three elements of equity receivership are also necessary to deal with private and 
municipal insolvencies). 
 242. See id. at 43 (suggesting that the equity receivership system serve as a 
model to modify the municipal insolvency laws); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S 
DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 56–60 (2001) (explaining 
the history of the equity receivership); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 21–22 
(2005) (explaining why equity receiverships developed). 
 243. Dimock, Legal Problems, supra note 190, at 44. 
 244. Id. at 46–47. 
 245. Id. at 50. 
 246. See id. at 51–52 (discussing suggested ways to invoke federal 
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necessary for one reason—to overcome the “obdurate minority” 
of dissenting creditors.247 
The early commentary makes clear, however, that 
although a municipal bankruptcy chapter may have been a 
necessary tool to resolve the national municipal debt crisis, it 
was an implement with a very limited use.248 The writers in the 
1930s called for robust state intervention in municipal fiscal 
affairs. They recognized that the binding debt adjustment 
facilitated by a bankruptcy chapter would be useless without 
some plan to control local finances.249 Only a state could 
provide the necessary administrative supervision over its 
localities in order to enable the municipalities to maximize 
revenues and borrow money at reasonable rates.250 Although 
commentators recognized that some might object to oversight 
of a municipality by state officials unfamiliar with local 
conditions, they also recognized the possibility that the 
problems of one municipality could have a negative impact on 
                                                                                                     
bankruptcy power in regulating municipal debt). 
 247. E.H. Foley, Jr., Recent Developments in Federal-Municipal 
Relationships, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 511 n.156 (1938); see also Reuschlein, supra 
note 186, at 368 (noting that a state could not enforce a debt adjustment plan 
against dissenting creditors because of the Contracts Clause of the 
Constitution).   
 248. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (noting that state control of 
municipal defeat is broad but with one fatal flaw: that it cannot compel 
agreement by creditors, therefore necessitating federal legislation to fill that 
gap). 
 249. See Dimock, Progress, supra note 202, at 204–05 (writing that, in order 
for bankruptcy to provide the same benefits for municipalities that it does for 
private entities, the state power to control municipalities must supplement the 
federal bankruptcy process); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 385 (warning that 
debt adjustment without a state plan to control local credit might lead to “more 
serious predicaments” than doing nothing). 
 250. See HILLHOUSE, supra note 182, at 353 (explaining that the state can 
“collect taxes, revise the local budget and approve or disapprove all new 
borrowing”); Kilpatrick, supra note 223, at 287 (observing that even if federal 
courts were constitutionally permitted to exercise fiscal oversight, they are 
poorly equipped to do so); Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 386 (noting that a 
readjustment plan cannot establish permanent mechanisms for the supervision 
of fiscal management). 
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the credit of other municipalities in the same state.251 Only 
state oversight could mitigate this possibility of contagion.252 
Several commentators called for formal cooperation between 
the states and the federal courts in municipal bankruptcy 
proceedings. Some suggested that the debt adjustment apparatus 
provided by federal law be available only to municipalities in 
states in which the state government exercised positive oversight 
with respect to local defaults.253 Others promoted a mechanism 
through which the state would be involved both before 
bankruptcy in formulating the plan of adjustment and after 
bankruptcy in supervising the municipality until its finances 
sufficiently improved.254 Experts considered state oversight such 
an essential complement to federal legislation that some 
suggested that the state be given the power to file the bankruptcy 
petition for its municipality.255 
Although experts expressed an appetite for a formal role for 
states in the federal municipal bankruptcy framework, 
Congress’s second attempt at municipal bankruptcy legislation, 
passed in 1937,256 was very similar to its first. Despite the 
similarities between the two acts, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Bekins upheld the second.257 In upholding the 1937 Act, 
known as Chapter X, the Court stressed that in order for a court 
to approve a debt readjustment plan, the debtor municipality 
                                                                                                     
 251. See Reuschlein, supra note 186, at 386–87 (discussing the effects of 
“purely local” conditions). 
 252. See id. (finding that the levels of administrative organization can 
adequately account for local conditions). 
 253. See Kilpatrick, supra note 223, at 289 (suggesting that the federal 
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must have been authorized by state law to take all action 
necessary to implement the plan.258 Moreover, the Court 
recognized that the statute, by deferring to the states’ control 
over their fiscal affairs, was narrowly drawn so as not to interfere 
with state sovereignty.259 Therefore, federal bankruptcy law did 
not unconstitutionally constrain the states’ powers to govern 
their municipalities. The Court emphasized the policy of 
cooperation implied by the bankruptcy law, explaining that the 
state “invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its 
agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue,” adding that 
through the state’s “cooperation with the national government 
the needed relief is given.”260 Mindful of the municipal debt crisis 
facing the nation, the Court refused to hold that the Constitution 
had rendered both the states and the federal government helpless 
to alleviate the problem.261 
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the early municipal 
bankruptcy commentary called for cooperation between states 
and the federal government in dealing with municipal financial 
failure. Congress fashioned the predecessor to Chapter 9 within 
this framework in order to solve the one problem that states 
alone could not: the holdout problem.262 No one intended for 
federal legislation to operate alone to solve the municipal debt 
problem; as Edward Dimock noted in his 1940 article assessing 
the progress made in addressing the municipal debt crisis, there 
was “plenty left to be done . . . when trouble comes again.”263 
Trouble came again in the 1970s when New York City fell into 
financial disrepair, presenting a municipal default scenario 
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 260. Id. at 54. 
 261. Id. 
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potentially as serious as the one the United States faced in the 
aftermath of the Depression.264  
C. Congress Revisits Municipal Financial Distress in 1976 
Three decades passed without any attention to municipal 
bankruptcy. Very few municipalities filed for bankruptcy during 
that period, and the municipalities that filed were special-
purpose districts rather than large general-purpose 
municipalities.265 The financial crisis facing New York City in the 
mid-1970s, however, caused policymakers to take a fresh look at 
the federal municipal bankruptcy legislation.266 When its crisis 
hit in 1975, closing the municipal bond markets,267 experts 
considered bankruptcy an unsuitable option for a city of New 
York’s size.268 Indeed, several elements of the federal municipal 
bankruptcy statute, then known as Chapter IX, made its use by a 
large city impractical.269  
The main concern about Chapter IX was that its entry 
requirements made its use by cities such as New York unfeasible. 
The law required a municipality to submit, with its bankruptcy 
petition, its plan of debt adjustment, agreed to by a majority in 
dollar amount of its creditors.270 Many saw this requirement as 
an impediment to speedy relief for a municipality because by the 
                                                                                                     
 264. See Joseph Patchan & Susan B. Collins, The 1976 Municipal 
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structural deficiencies in the municipal bankruptcy chapter, such as its lack of 
an automatic stay and its requirement that the debtor municipality submit a 
plan of adjustment with its petition, made its use by large cities impracticable). 
 270. King, supra note 23, at 1158; Patchan & Collins, supra note 264, at 290. 
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1970s, many cities had a large number of bondholders, many of 
whom held their bonds in bearer form and were therefore difficult 
to identify.271 
The 1976 Act simplified the entry requirement. Rather than 
requiring a prepetition plan, the 1976 legislation made a plan one 
of four alternative prerequisites to filing. If the debtor 
municipality did not negotiate a plan with its creditors before 
filing for bankruptcy, it could still file if it showed that it 
negotiated in good faith with its creditors before filing or that 
negotiating with its creditors was impracticable.272  
Loosening the entry requirement addressed the major 
concern about the utility of Chapter IX for a large city such as 
New York.273 Congress went further, however, and incorporated 
several features of private entity reorganization into the 
municipal bankruptcy chapter. The 1976 amendments added an 
automatic stay, which by then was a feature of other chapters of 
the Bankruptcy Act and which allowed the municipal debtor to 
avoid the extra time and expense of separately petitioning the 
court to stay proceedings against it.274 Congress also added 
avoiding powers to Chapter IX that mirrored the trustee’s power 
in other bankruptcy chapters to avoid prepetition transfers of the 
debtor’s property shown to be fraudulent, preferential, or 
unperfected.275 The power to avoid preferential transfers proved 
problematic with respect to municipal bonds when Cleveland fell 
into financial distress in 1979, leading to further amendments to 
municipal bankruptcy law in 1988 to inject some certainty into 
the treatment of municipal bondholders in Chapter 9.276 
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One rehabilitative provision added to Chapter IX in 1976 was 
the power of the debtor to reject executory contracts. This power 
was available to private debtors in other bankruptcy chapters277 
but was potentially controversial when exercised by public 
debtors. From its initial enactment, the federal municipal 
bankruptcy chapter respected and yielded to each state’s right to 
govern its cities,278 and the 1976 Act did not change this. Like its 
predecessors, the 1976 municipal bankruptcy act provided that 
nothing in the Act “shall be construed to limit or impair the 
power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any 
municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State in the 
exercise of its political or governmental powers.”279 Because the 
power to reject executory contracts encompassed the power to 
reject labor contracts, which are often subject to state collective 
bargaining laws, this new power created a potential federalism 
problem.280  
Although Kimhi suggested that the inclusion of the power to 
reject executory contracts was evidence of Chapter 9’s broader 
restructuring goal,281 there is another way to look at the 1976 
additions to the municipal bankruptcy chapter. By the 1970s, the 
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municipal bankruptcy law drafted in the 1930s was unsuitable 
for larger cities, largely because of its entry requirements. When 
Congress liberalized the entry requirements, it also added some 
elements of private bankruptcy law, such as the automatic stay 
and the powers to avoid preferential and fraudulent transfers. All 
of these powers relate to debt adjustment, not to reorganizational 
governance. By giving a municipal debtor some additional 
bankruptcy benefits, Congress provided the states with 
additional tools for resolving the financial distress of their cities if 
they chose to accept the assistance of federal law.282 Rather than 
rejecting Congress’s original municipal bankruptcy goal of solving 
the holdout problem, the 1976 amendments strengthened it.  
New York did not resort to bankruptcy. Instead, the state 
legislature established the Municipal Assistance Corporation 
(MAC) and authorized the MAC to issue debt for the city and 
draft a rescue program for the city.283 The city’s finances were 
placed under the supervision of a control board that included city 
and state officials, and the federal government deemed New 
York’s problems to be significant enough nationally to enter into 
a credit agreement with the city.284 New York’s recovery was 
successful because the state acted quickly and drastically.285  
The 1970s saw two parallel developments. In one, New York 
State, with the financial help of the federal government, 
orchestrated a recovery plan for New York City without resort to 
the bankruptcy laws. In the other, Congress amended the 
bankruptcy law to make its municipal bankruptcy chapter a 
workable alternative for large general-purpose municipalities and 
in the process, added some features of corporate bankruptcy. At 
the same time, the municipal bankruptcy scholarship focused 
primarily on what the federal bankruptcy law standing alone 
could do for cities, and thus differed from the 1930s scholarship, 
which promoted a federal municipal bankruptcy chapter as a 
complement to state intervention.286 Although two commentators 
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pronounced the 1976 Act as deficient in that it did not provide a 
mechanism to involve the state in the formulation of a city’s 
bankruptcy plan,287 two writers involved in the rescue of New 
York City attributed the city’s avoidance of bankruptcy in part to 
“the strong belief that elected and not appointed officials ought to 
put the city’s fiscal matters in order.”288 After the 1970s, 
scholarship about municipal bankruptcy tended to present it as 
an alternative to state intervention,289 and because of some of its 
differences from Chapter 11, a poor alternative at that.  
This turn in the scholarship is unfortunate, because it leaves 
state policymakers with few recent resources as they decide 
whether and how to allow their municipalities to file for 
bankruptcy. Detroit’s filing is likely to lead other states with 
struggling cities to reevaluate the conditions that they place on 
Chapter 9 filings. It is important that states not lose sight of the 
role of Chapter 9 in an integrated state–federal approach to 
municipal financial distress. In the next section, I explain how 
Congress has invited states to play a role in Chapter 9 debtor 
governance and the extent to which states have chosen to do so. 
V. Specific Authorization to File for Chapter 9: An Invitation to 
Govern 
The specific authorization requirement gives the states a 
gatekeeper role by allowing the states to choose whether, and 
under what conditions, their municipalities can file for 
bankruptcy. Chapter 9 does not grant municipalities the power to 
file for bankruptcy; rather, it presents to the states the choice of 
giving their municipalities the power to seek bankruptcy 
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protection.290 By granting the states this gatekeeper role, 
Congress not only exercised care to ensure that the municipal 
bankruptcy chapter passed constitutional muster, it also provided 
a mechanism for state participation in the federal bankruptcy 
process.  
The authorization requirement is a governance control that 
reflects the hybrid fresh start–rehabilitation goal of Chapter 9. 
All Chapter 9 can do on its own is give debt relief.291 Combined 
with state intervention, however, Chapter 9 can both give debt 
relief and facilitate municipal rehabilitation. Although the 
original intention of Congress was for Chapter 9 to support state 
governance over the debtor, the invitation to states to exercise 
that governance was not explicit until Congress amended 
Chapter 9 in 1994 to condition entry on specific, rather than 
general, authorization by the state.292 In this section, I explain 
the evolution of the authorization requirement and the role that 
it plays in inviting state governance over Chapter 9 debtors. 
A. Reasons for and Evolution of the Authorization Requirement 
A municipality may file for bankruptcy only if it is 
“specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by 
name, to be a debtor [under Chapter 9] by State law or by a 
governmental officer or organization empowered by State law” to 
authorize a Chapter 9 filing.293 The requirement that a state 
authorize its municipalities to file is one that has developed over 
the lifetime of the municipal bankruptcy law. The act that the 
Bekins Court found to be constitutional contained no requirement 
of state authorization, but the Court nevertheless found that the 
statute was consistent with the Tenth Amendment because it 
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prohibited “interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs” 
of a municipality and because it required that the debtor 
municipality be permitted by state law to carry out its plan of 
adjustment.294 Courts after Bekins interpreted the municipal 
bankruptcy law as an opt-out statute: a state was not required to 
affirmatively authorize a municipality to file for bankruptcy, but 
it could prohibit its municipalities from doing so.295  
The 1976 amendments to Chapter IX included state 
authorization as a requirement for entry into the municipal 
bankruptcy process. As a result of those amendments, a 
municipality was required to allege that it was generally 
authorized by state law to file for bankruptcy.296 Lawrence King, 
a leading bankruptcy scholar at the time, viewed this as an opt-in 
requirement that necessitated an affirmative state act.297 He 
expressed concern that the general authorization requirement 
might deprive a state of flexibility in determining whether a 
municipality within the state should file. King speculated that a 
city facing an unexpected financial crisis in a state that had no 
authorizing legislation on its books might unnecessarily languish 
in its financial crisis while the state legislature acted to pass the 
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necessary legislation.298 According to King, the prior requirement 
that a city could file unless prohibited from filing was a superior 
way to ensure that states played an affirmative role in deciding 
how to resolve their cities’ financial crises.299  
Not all courts interpreted the general authorization 
requirement as a mandate that a state opt in to the federal 
bankruptcy regime, resulting in a non-uniform standard for state 
consent. Although some courts interpreted the general 
authorization requirement to require an affirmative act by the 
state allowing municipalities to file,300 others found authorization 
to file for bankruptcy if the state had authorized a municipality to 
borrow money, enter into contracts, or sue and defend suits.301 
When Bridgeport filed for bankruptcy, the court found that the 
city was authorized to file, despite objections by both the state 
attorney general and a review board that the state created to 
oversee the city’s finances.302 The bankruptcy court held that 
although the general authorization requirement necessitated 
some affirmative act by the state to allow the city to file for 
bankruptcy, the state had given such authorization by granting 
the city home rule authority over its borrowing, finances, and 
property.303  
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Congress resolved the confusion over the meaning of the 
general authorization requirement in 1994. The 1994 
amendments to the Code added the current requirement that a 
municipality be specifically authorized by its state to file for 
bankruptcy.304 The specific authorization requirement 
implements the original vision for a municipal bankruptcy 
chapter as stated by the Court in Bekins: it allows the state to 
“invite[] the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its 
agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue.”305 A state 
may impose its own conditions on access to Chapter 9 and thus 
design a framework for state participation in developing a 
rehabilitation plan for its municipalities with the help of the 
bankruptcy court. In the next section, I discuss the various ways 
in which states have implemented this specific authorization 
requirement and discuss how they further, or fail to further, the 
goals of Chapter 9. 
B. Implementation of State Authorization 
Although Congress enacted the original municipal 
bankruptcy law to allow states to invite the power of federal law 
to remedy financial problems that the states, on their own, could 
not remedy, not all states have laws that reflect this purpose. 
Twenty-seven states permit at least some of their municipalities 
to file for bankruptcy.306 The remaining states have no statute 
addressing the issue, with the exception of Georgia, which 
prohibits its municipalities from filing,307 and Illinois, which does 
not authorize its cities to file but gives a Financial Planning and 
Supervision Commission the power to recommend that a 
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municipality file a Chapter 9 petition.308 Many states that do not 
authorize their municipalities to file for bankruptcy also lack a 
state program to intervene in municipal financial distress. 309  
Even in states that authorize their municipalities to file for 
Chapter 9, bankruptcy authorization and state oversight do not 
always go hand in hand. Several states allow their municipalities 
to file for bankruptcy without any restrictions other than those 
imposed by the Bankruptcy Code.310 These statutes contemplate 
no pre-bankruptcy state fiscal oversight, nor do they mandate 
any role for the state during the Chapter 9 case. The absence of a 
pre-bankruptcy state oversight requirement does not mean that 
the state cannot provide fiscal oversight in bankruptcy,311 but it 
means that the extent of such oversight will be uncertain until a 
municipality files for bankruptcy. It is in the states that require 
no state involvement in a municipality’s decision to file for 
bankruptcy that the fear that Chapter 9 will do nothing to 
remedy the conditions that led to a municipality’s financial ills 
rings most true. Alabama, the home of the largest municipal 
bankruptcy ever filed until Detroit’s filing, is one of those 
states.312 Not only does Alabama lack a municipal oversight 
program but the state refused to intervene to help Jefferson 
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GOALS AND GOVERNANCE 463 
County resolve its financial difficulties without filing for 
bankruptcy. 313 
Some states impose stronger bankruptcy governance controls 
by requiring a municipality to obtain the approval of a public 
official before filing for bankruptcy. Some of these statutes are 
unclear as to the level of governance that the state will provide. 
For example, Connecticut’s statute requires that a municipality 
obtain the written consent of the governor before filing for 
bankruptcy, but the statute says nothing about the state’s 
involvement in a Chapter 9 case.314 Louisiana’s statute requires 
both the governor and the attorney general to approve the petition 
before any municipality can file for Chapter 9.315 The Louisiana 
statute also requires the governor and attorney general to approve 
the plan of adjustment, although it does not require that the 
governor and attorney general be involved in developing the 
plan.316 Moreover, the Louisiana statute provides no guidelines for 
the approval or disapproval of a petition or plan.317 In these states, 
there is a loose tie between state oversight and bankruptcy 
authorization in that the state must be involved in the 
municipality’s decision to file for Chapter 9, although it does not 
appear that bankruptcy is incorporated into a state municipal 
oversight program. 
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Several states have oversight programs that allow the state to 
intervene in municipal finances. North Carolina, whose municipal 
financial oversight program is considered to be the “gold standard” 
for such programs, and New Jersey, which is also known for 
providing more assistance to its cities than most states, 
implemented their programs soon after the Great Depression 
brought a wave of municipal bond defaults.318 These programs 
provide budget oversight and intervention in the event of a default 
on the part of a municipality.319 Kentucky also has a Depression-
era statute that allows the state to “assist counties whose financial 
affairs have become so involved that they have seemed to be 
beyond local solution and . . . to curb deplorable practices due to 
inefficiency, carelessness, or in some instances, quasi criminality 
in the handling of county finances in utter disregard of the public 
welfare.”320  
Kentucky and New Jersey have integrated the bankruptcy 
process into their state oversight programs. In Kentucky, a county 
may file for bankruptcy only if two state officials approve its 
petition and proposed plan of adjustment.321 Once the county files, 
it may amend its plan only if the same state officials approve of the 
amendments. 322 Although Kentucky law does not require that a 
county participate in a state oversight program before filing for 
bankruptcy, a county may ask the state for its assistance in 
                                                                                                     
 318. PEW REPORT, supra note 127, at 33–36; Natalie Cohen, 
Intergovernmental Theater: Spotlight on Michigan, Wells Fargo Securities 
Municipal Securities Research Municipal Commentary, Jan. 16, 2013. 
 319. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-7 to -42 (2013) (codifying the North Carolina 
Local Government Budget and Fiscal Control Act); id. § 159-176 (authorizing 
the North Carolina Local Government Commission to assist a local government 
in refinancing or adjusting its debt); Donald H. Elliott, Proposed Fiscal 
Monitoring Legislation in New York: A Comparative Analysis, 8 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 109, 113–19 (1979) (explaining New Jersey’s fiscal oversight of its 
municipalities).  
 320. Lincoln Nat’l Bank v. Cnty. Debt Comm’n, 172 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Ky. 
1943). See generally Glenn D. Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky (pts. 
1 & 2), 31 KY. L.J. 122, 242 (1942–1943), for an early explanation of the law. 
 321. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66.400 (West 2013) (providing that “the state 
local debt officer and the state local finance officer” must approve the petition 
and proposed plan of adjustment before “[a]ny taxing agency or instrumentality, 
as defined in Chapter IX of the Federal Bankruptcy Act,” may file a petition as 
provided in the Federal Bankruptcy Act). 
 322. Id. 
GOALS AND GOVERNANCE 465 
restructuring county debt, and the state may intervene in a 
county’s finances if the county is in default on any indebtedness.323 
New Jersey has a similar statute, which requires the state’s 
municipal finance commission to approve both the petition324 and 
the plan of adjustment.325 A municipality that is unable to pay its 
debts can apply for state oversight,326 and the state can place a 
defaulting municipality under state supervision on the request of 
the holder of the unpaid bonds or notes.327 When a municipality is 
placed under state oversight, the municipal finance commission 
appoints an auditor to recommend a budget for the municipality 
and to approve contracts and capital improvements.328  
The existence of a state oversight program does not 
necessarily mean that the state integrates Chapter 9 into that 
program. North Carolina requires approval of the Local 
Government Commission before any municipality can file for 
bankruptcy, but the statute is unclear regarding any involvement 
by the commission in the Chapter 9 case.329 Moreover, some 
                                                                                                     
 323. Id. § 66.320. 
 324. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-40 (West 2013) (providing that “[a]ny 
county, municipality, school district or other political subdivision of this State” 
shall not file a petition under the municipal bankruptcy act “unless the approval 
of the municipal finance commission . . . be first had and obtained”). 
 325. See id. § 52:27-42 (“No plan of readjustment filed with or in the 
proceedings upon any such petition shall be approved by the court or put into 
temporary effect or finally confirmed without the approval of the commission.”). 
 326. Id. If a “municipality is not in a position to meet its obligations when 
due,” it may institute a civil action in the Superior Court. Id. If the court finds 
that “the municipality is so unable to meet its obligations, it may enter 
judgment to that effect.” Id. Upon such entry, “the commission shall function in 
such municipality with all the powers and duties conferred by this chapter.” Id. 
 327. Id. The “holder of any notes or bonds of any municipality of this State” 
may institute an action against a municipality that is unable to pay its debts. 
Id. If the court finds that the municipality is in default, then it may enter 
judgment to that effect, and the commission will then exercise its powers and 
duties over the defaulting municipality. Id. 
 328. See id. § 52:27-13.1 (describing the powers and duties of an auditor). 
 329. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (2013) (allowing a North Carolina 
municipality to obtain the approval of the Local Government Commission before 
filing for bankruptcy); id. § 159-176 (allowing the Local Government 
Commission to assist a municipality in adjusting its debts after a default and 
allowing the commission to petition a state court for an order directing the 
municipality to carry out the plan). Largely due to robust state oversight, no 
North Carolina municipality has defaulted on a bond obligation since 1942. PEW 
REPORT, supra note 127, at 33. 
466 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403 (2014) 
states that have an intervention program have no legislation 
authorizing their municipalities to file for Chapter 9.330  
Recent municipal bankruptcies and threats of same have 
caused some states to revisit their authorizing legislation. 
California amended its authorization statute after Vallejo filed 
for bankruptcy. Vallejo’s bankruptcy was expensive and time-
consuming, and some question whether it brought any benefits at 
all to the city.331 California’s statute, enacted at the behest of the 
public employee unions,332 requires that a municipality 
contemplating bankruptcy must first enter into a confidential 
mediation process with its creditors.333 Although its detractors 
criticize the statute for potentially delaying a necessary 
Chapter 9 filing for a distressed city,334 its supporters contend 
that if a municipality is required to negotiate in good faith with 
its creditors before filing, it might either avoid Chapter 9 or 
develop a prenegotiated plan, thus reducing the duration and cost 
of the Chapter 9 case.335 California continues to eschew state 
oversight of municipal finances; during the legislative process 
                                                                                                     
 330. See PEW REPORT, supra note 127, at 9–10 (listing bankruptcy 
authorization statutes and state intervention programs state-by-state). 
 331. See Denniston, supra note 21, at 273 (explaining that Vallejo’s Chapter 
9 took 3 years, cost $13 million, and left a $3.4 million shortfall in the city’s first 
post-bankruptcy budget). 
 332. See Editorial, Cities Could Find Budget Fire Escape Blocked, ORANGE 
COUNTY REG. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/union-317114-
bankruptcy-pension.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (explaining that the bill 
was backed by two public employee unions) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Ed Mendel, In Looming Stockton Bankruptcy, Pensions Won’t 
Be Cut, CAPITOL WEEKLY (June 7, 2012), http://capitolweekly.net/in-looming-
stockton-bankruptcy-pensions-wont-be-cut/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) 
(explaining that the unions backed the legislation because they feared, after 
Vallejo’s bankruptcy, that cities filing for bankruptcy would break their labor 
contracts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 333. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760(a) (West 2013). A municipality may avoid this 
process by declaring a fiscal emergency. Id. § 53760(b). 
 334. See Christine A. Schleppegrell, Ad Hoc Legislation Creates Barriers to A 
Chapter 9 Filing, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 48, 48 (2013) (criticizing new state 
restrictions on Chapter 9 as creating “an unpredictable pathway to 
bankruptcy”). 
 335. Denniston, supra note 21, at 261. Ms. Denniston helped draft Assembly 
Bill 506 (AB 506). AB 506 has not eliminated eligibility fights. See In re City of 
Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 795 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (holding, over the objection 
of the capital markets creditors, that the city was eligible for Chapter 9 because 
it had negotiated in good faith with its creditors). 
GOALS AND GOVERNANCE 467 
preceding the enactment of the new statute, state leaders insisted 
that the bill could not increase the financial burdens on the 
state.336 Therefore, although California accepted the Bankruptcy 
Code’s invitation to place conditions on the ability of its 
municipalities to file, its legislation does nothing to further the 
foundational goal of municipal bankruptcy law, which was to 
invite the federal power to solve a problem that the state could 
not solve on its own. 
Other states whose cities have suffered financial threats 
have modified their authorization statutes to more explicitly link 
the authorization to file for bankruptcy with state oversight. The 
Rhode Island legislature enacted its Fiscal Stability Act out of a 
concern that Central Falls’ 2010 receivership petition would lead 
to other receivership petitions by Rhode Island municipalities.337 
A Rhode Island city cannot file for bankruptcy without taking 
three intermediate steps, each of which requires the city to 
submit to increasing levels of fiscal oversight.338 It is only after 
the appointment of a receiver, the third and last of the 
intermediate steps, that a city can file for bankruptcy, and the 
authorizing statute grants the receiver the power to file the 
Chapter 9 petition.339  
                                                                                                     
 336. Denniston, supra note 21, at 282. 
 337. Kishfy, supra note 21, at 350. 
 338. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-9-5 to -7 (2013) (providing three intermediate 
steps that a Rhode Island city or town must take before being able to file for 
bankruptcy). First, “[t]he fiscal overseer shall report in writing to the division of 
municipal finance if the fiscal overseer concludes that the city or town” meets 
one of four conditions, and “[i[f the fiscal overseer believes, at any time, that a 
budget commission should be appointed, the fiscal overseer may report that 
belief to the division of municipal finance.” Id. § 45-9-5. Second, a budget 
commission can be established. Id. § 45-9-6. Third, “[i]f the budget commission 
established by § 45-9-5 concludes that its powers are insufficient to restore fiscal 
stability to the city or town, it shall notify the director of revenue;” when the 
director of revenue receives a statement of the reasons why the budget 
commission is unable to restore fiscal stability to the city or town, “the director 
of revenue shall appoint a receiver for the city or town for a period as the 
director of revenue may determine.” Id. § 45-9-7. 
 339. Id. § 45-9-7. The statute allows the state to bypass the intermediate 
steps in some circumstances. See id. § 45-9-8 (allowing the state’s director of 
revenue to appoint a receiver for a city facing a fiscal emergency if 
circumstances do not permit the appointment of a fiscal overseer or budget 
commission). 
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Michigan’s law has a tortured history. In 1988, to respond to 
the effects that the 1980s recession had on its cities, Michigan 
enacted a law that allowed the state to appoint an emergency 
financial manager for a municipality experiencing a financial 
emergency.340 Although the statutory allocation of authority 
between the emergency financial manager and the municipality’s 
elected officials was somewhat unclear, it was widely understood 
that the law permitted local officials to exercise all of their 
powers other than the budget and fiscal powers that the statute 
gave to the emergency financial manager.341 In 2011, as the 
financial picture in Detroit and other Michigan cities became 
increasingly dire, Michigan enacted a law transforming the 
emergency financial manager into an emergency manager.342 The 
effect of that law was to allow the state to replace all of a 
financially stressed municipality’s elected officials with an official 
appointed by the governor.343 Under that law, only the emergency 
manager had the power to file a bankruptcy petition for the 
municipality with the governor’s approval.344 Michigan voters 
rejected that law in 2012 and the legislature quickly responded 
with a statute that gives a financially distressed city four choices: 
the appointment of an emergency manager, Chapter 9 
bankruptcy, mediation with its creditors, or a consent agreement 
with the state to reduce its debt.345 
                                                                                                     
 340. See Philo, supra note 129, at 83 (describing the enacted law). 
 341. Id. at 84. 
 342. See id. at 85 (discussing the Local Government and School District 
Fiscal Accountability Act). 
 343. See Anderson, Radical Experimentation, supra note 113, at 586–91 
(explaining the evolution of Michigan’s law and explaining that it had a 
disproportionate effect on cities with large African-American populations). 
 344. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4) (repealed 2012) (stating that 
“[u]pon the confirmation of a finding of a financial emergency, the governor 
shall declare the local government in receivership and shall appoint an 
emergency manager to act for and in the place and stead of the governing body 
and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government”); id. 
§ 141.1523 (stating that if the emergency manager determines there is “no 
reasonable alternative to rectifying the financial emergency of the local 
government,” then the emergency manager may recommend to the governor and 
state treasurer that the local government be authorized to proceed under Title 
11 of the United States Code). The governor must approve this recommendation 
in order for the local government to become a debtor under Title 11. Id. 
 345. See id. § 141.1547 (providing four local government options to address a 
financial emergency). Once a financial emergency is confirmed, the governing 
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Michigan law grants the emergency manager broad powers. 
As under the 2011 law, the emergency manager replaces all of the 
affected municipality’s elected officials, who possess only the 
powers granted to them by the emergency manager.346 As was 
illustrated in the Detroit case, if an emergency manager is 
appointed, the emergency manager decides whether to file a 
Chapter 9 petition for the city, and can only do so with the 
approval of the governor.347 Only the emergency manager has the 
authority to act for the municipality during the Chapter 9 case.348 
A city in Michigan can file for bankruptcy even if it does not 
choose the emergency manager option, but it needs the governor’s 
approval to do so. The governor may condition approval on the 
appointment of someone to act for the municipality in its 
Chapter 9 case.349 
                                                                                                     
body of the local government must by resolution, “within 7 days after the 
confirmation of a finding of a financial emergency,” select one of four local 
government options to address the financial emergency. Id.; Chris Christoff, 
Michigan Lawmakers Approve New Emergency Manager Law, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
27, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-27/michigan-lawmakers-
approve-new-emergency-manager-law.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) 
(discussing the repeal of the 2011 law, which “gave the state the power to 
appoint an emergency manager or impose a consent agreement” and was 
criticized as “undemocratic and an attempt to bust unions”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). On March 14, 2013, the governor of 
Michigan appointed an emergency manager for Detroit. Matthew Dolan & Jeff 
Bennett, Manager Tapped for Detroit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2013, at A2. 
 346. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(2) (2013). 
 347. See id. § 141.1558(1) (“If, in the judgment of the emergency manager, 
no reasonable alternative to rectifying the financial emergency of the local 
government which is in receivership exists, then the emergency manager may 
recommend to the governor and the state treasurer that the local government be 
authorized to proceed under chapter 9.”). The governor must approve the 
emergency manager’s recommendation in order for the local government to 
proceed under Chapter 9. Id. Upon approval, the emergency manager is 
empowered “to act exclusively on the local government’s behalf in any such case 
under chapter 9.” Id. Immediately before Detroit filed for bankruptcy, several 
suits were filed in state court by city workers, retirees, and pension boards, 
claiming that the Michigan Constitution does not allow the governor to 
authorize a bankruptcy filing because doing so could cause pension benefits to 
be modified in contravention of the constitution. Brent Snavely, Pension Funds 
Filed Lawsuit Earlier than Planned to Beat Detroit Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (July 18, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/NEWS01/ 
307180125/pension-funds-lawsuit-chapter-9-bankruptcy-kevyn-orr (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 348. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1558(1) (2013). 
 349. Id. § 141.1566. 
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The Rhode Island and Michigan approaches to Chapter 9 
illustrate that some of the academic concerns about Chapter 9 
governance can be and have been alleviated by states. In these 
states, the question is not whether there is restructuring 
oversight of a dysfunctional city, it is whether the oversight is 
appropriate. Receivership and emergency manager statutes have 
been criticized and challenged on several grounds: such statutes 
violate home rule statutes that give the citizens of municipalities 
the right to govern themselves;350 they have a disproportionate 
impact on communities with large poor351 and African-
American352 populations; and they do not anticipate or facilitate 
the kind of nonfinancial structural reform, such as the 
consolidation of municipalities, that might be necessary to truly 
alleviate a city’s financial distress.353 Although these are 
important criticisms, they are unrelated to the efficacy of 
Chapter 9. When viewed alone, all Chapter 9 can do is reduce a 
municipality’s debt. In enacting municipal bankruptcy 
legislation, however, Congress did not intend for bankruptcy law 
to stand alone in resolving municipal financial distress. In the 
next section, I explain Pennsylvania’s still-evolving process of 
revising its distressed municipalities statute in order to illustrate 
what happens when business and political leaders lose sight of 
                                                                                                     
 350. See, e.g., Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 574–75 (R.I. 2011) 
(challenging the Rhode Island oversight statute); Kishfy, supra note 21, at 369–
77 (explaining Rhode Island’s home rule tradition); Lyle Kossis, Note, 
Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership and Local Autonomy, 
98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1121–28 (2012) (explaining the incompatibility of home rule 
and municipal receivership). 
 351. See Philo, supra note 129, at 101–05 (arguing that Michigan and Rhode 
Island’s “statutes suspend citizens’ right to vote in poorer communities that are 
particularly vulnerable to economic cycles and corresponding downturns”). “The 
laws suspend the right to vote, by replacing local elected officials with state 
appointed managers and receivers.” Id. at 101. 
 352. See Anderson, Radical Experimentation, supra note 113, at 590 (“The 
four cities already approved for intervention have proportionately large African-
American populations: Benton Harbor is 91.4% African-American, Flint is 
59.5%, Pontiac is 55.3%, and Ecorse is 48.6%.”). 
 353. See id. at 582 (explaining that granting fiscal control over a city to the 
state does nothing to “ameliorate structural causes of financial distress, like 
concentrated poverty, the loss of middle-class jobs across a region, or local 
borders that fragment a single metropolitan area into socioeconomically 
segregated cities”). 
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the fact that Chapter 9 was enacted to assist, rather than thwart, 
state efforts to rehabilitate their municipalities.  
VI. Authorization Meets Governance, Eventually: Pennsylvania’s 
Story 
The story of Pennsylvania’s response to its capital city’s 
financial problems contains several lessons about municipal 
bankruptcy. It shows how confusion reigns when little-used laws 
are dusted off and considered as tools to solve pressing problems. 
Because Chapter 9 is so rarely used, decisionmakers may be 
unaware of its interplay with state oversight laws. Harrisburg’s 
business and government leaders viewed bankruptcy and state 
intervention as competing, rather than complementary, methods 
for resolving municipal financial distress. Their 
misunderstanding of the interaction between Chapter 9 and state 
recovery schemes led, for a short time, to an undesirable 
legislative result in Pennsylvania. 
Pennsylvania’s body of law regarding authorization to file for 
bankruptcy illustrates both the reactive nature of state oversight 
laws and their interplay with bankruptcy authorization. The 
bankruptcy authorization rules for most cities, counties, and 
towns in Pennsylvania are found in the Municipalities Financial 
Recovery Act, also known as Act 47.354 Enacted in 1987 to address 
the municipal financial distress caused by the contraction of the 
steel industry in the western part of the state,355 Act 47 
established a financial intervention program administered by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic 
Development (DCED).356 A municipality that receives a distress 
                                                                                                     
 354. 53 PA. CONS. STAT § 11701.101 (2013). Philadelphia is the exception. It 
cannot file for bankruptcy without the Governor’s approval, a restriction placed 
upon the city in 1991, when the state enacted a recovery statute for that city. Id. 
§ 12720.211; see also Drew Patrick Gannon, Comment, An Analysis of 
Pennsylvania’s Legislative Programs for Financially Distressed Municipalities 
and the Reaction of Municipal Labor Unions, 98 DICK. L. REV. 281, 291–94 
(1994) (explaining the history of the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental 
Cooperation Authority Act for Cities of the First Class). 
 355. See Gannon, supra note 354, at 281 (explaining the history of Act 47). 
 356. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.103 (defining “Department” as “[t]he 
Department of Community Affairs of the Commonwealth”). The Department of 
Community Affairs was merged with the Department of Commerce in 1996 to 
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determination must work with a coordinator appointed by the 
state to develop a financial recovery plan.357 Although 
commentators lauded Act 47 as an example of proactive state 
oversight over its cities,358 it has not been a great success in 
reviving Pennsylvania’s municipalities. The state has accepted 
twenty-seven municipalities into the program, but only six have 
exited.359 Six cities have been in the program for more than 
twenty-five years.360 
The original proponents of Act 47 did not design the program 
as an exclusive alternative to Chapter 9. The legislature revisited 
Pennsylvania’s bankruptcy authorization statute at the time it 
developed Act 47 and included the preconditions for Chapter 9 
filing in Act 47.361 Before June 2011, municipalities could file for 
                                                                                                     
become the Department of Community and Economic Development. See 71 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 1709.301(a)(9) (transferring the powers of the Department of 
Community Affairs under the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act to the 
Department of Community and Economic Development). 
 357. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.221. A municipality in the program may 
receive permission to raise its taxes above the legal limits and is eligible for 
loans and grants from the state. Id. § 11701.123. 
 358. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 473 (explaining some of the 
benefits of state intervention, using Scranton’s Act 47 status as an example). In 
2002, Fred Tung cited Act 47 as possibly “particularly instructive insofar as it 
has actually gotten some use,” and also used Scranton as an example. Tung, 
supra note 3, at 917 n.146. 
 359. List of Act 47 Distress Determinations, PA. DEP’T OF CMTY. & ECON. DEV. 
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.newpa.com/local-government/services-we-provide-
local-governments/request-assistance/list-of-act-47-distress-determinations (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Twenty years after its entry into Act 47, Scranton not only remained distressed 
but was frequently reported to be considering a Chapter 9 filing. See, e.g., David 
Falchek, Some Tout Bankruptcy as Scranton’s Way Out, Others Say It’s No 
Picnic, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE (June 27, 2012), http://thetimes-
tribune.com/news/some-tout-bankruptcy-as-scranton-s-way-out-others-say-it-s-
no-picnic-1.1335580 (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (discussing Scranton’s 
bankruptcy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Municipal 
Bankruptcy: The Sadness of Scranton, THE ECONOMIST (July 21, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21559382 (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (same) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Williams Walsh, Crushed 
by Promises, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at B1 (same). 
 360. See List of Act 47 Distress Determinations, PA. DEP’T OF CMTY. & ECON. 
DEV. (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.newpa.com/local-government/services-we-
provide-local-governments/request-assistance/list-of-act-47-distress-determina 
tions (last visited Dec. 25, 2013) (listing six cities that joined the program before 
January 9, 1989) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 361. See J. Pub. Hearing on Act 47 Before the H. Urban Affairs Comm., H. 
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Chapter 9 if one of five conditions was met, and the law at that 
time allowed a municipality to file for bankruptcy without the 
prior approval of any state officer.362 Not only does Act 47 set 
forth the conditions under which a municipality may file for 
Chapter 9,363 it mandates that if a city is not in the Act 47 
program at the time it files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy filing 
will trigger a distress determination that will place the city in the 
program.364 The distress determination allows the state to 
appoint an Act 47 coordinator, who must develop a debt 
adjustment plan that can be confirmed by the bankruptcy 
court.365 Act 47 therefore anticipated both that a municipality 
under state oversight might be required to resort to bankruptcy, 
and that a municipality not yet under state oversight that 
decided to file for bankruptcy would then receive state guidance 
in the bankruptcy. The original Act 47 included the possibility of 
a municipal bankruptcy filing as a necessary component of a 
municipal financial recovery scheme with the state providing the 
necessary reorganizational governance in Chapter 9. 
The possibility of a bankruptcy filing by Harrisburg started 
to emerge in the press roughly two years before the city filed its 
petition.366 The mere mention of Chapter 9 triggered a deluge of 
                                                                                                     
Local Gov’t Comm., S. Cmty., Econ. & Recreational Dev. Comm., and S. Local 
Gov’t Comm., 2011 Leg., 195th Sess. 14 (Pa. 2011) [hereinafter Act 47 Hearing] 
(statement of Michael Gasbarre, Exec. Dir., Local Gov’t Comm’n of the Pa. Gen. 
Assembly) (explaining that one of the original objectives of the task force that 
proposed Act 47 was the “creation of an updated procedure to enable distressed 
municipalities to file for municipal debt readjustment action under Federal 
law”). 
 362. See Moringiello, supra note 21, at 249 (explaining Pennsylvania law 
before June 30, 2012). 
 363. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.261 (2013) (authorizing municipalities 
“to file a municipal debt adjustment action pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code” if 
one of four conditions is met). 
 364. Id. § 11701.262. This provision of the statute has been used only once, 
in the bankruptcy of Westfall Township, a small municipality that was rendered 
insolvent by a large judgment. See Act 47 Hearing, supra note 361, at 89 
(statement of James H. Roberts) (explaining that Westfall Township was the 
first municipality in the history of Act 47 to invoke its bankruptcy provisions). 
 365. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.262. 
 366. See Editorial, Harrisburg: Where Does City Go From Here?, HARRISBURG 
PATRIOT-NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index. 
ssf/2009/09/where_does_city_go_from_here.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) 
(“Harrisburg has three viable options: Sell assets, enter the state’s ‘distressed 
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opposition from state officials and business leaders. Sprinkled 
throughout those press accounts were reports of high-level 
misunderstandings about the effects of a bankruptcy filing.367 
Business leaders and politicians seemed unable to distinguish 
bankruptcy from insolvency, expressing concern about the effect 
of a Chapter 9 filing on the city’s bond rating when Harrisburg’s 
bonds had been rated five grades below investment grade for over 
a year.368 The very highest level of state government revealed a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Act 47’s integration of 
bankruptcy law and state oversight when then-Governor Ed 
Rendell warned that if Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy, a 
bankruptcy judge, not the citizens of Harrisburg, would control 
the city’s destiny.369 
                                                                                                     
city’ program or declare bankruptcy.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 367. For example, the mayors of three distressed Pennsylvania cities, 
Harrisburg, Reading, and Scranton, described bankruptcy “as creating a 
perception to the business community, the people and the rest of the world that 
Harrisburg isn’t solvent and would be unable to pay its bills.” Scott La Mar, 
Mayors of Harrisburg, Reading, and Scranton Say that Bankruptcy Is Not the 
Answer, WITF SMART TALK (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.witf.org/smart-talk/ 
2011/11/mayors-of-harrisburg-reading-and-scranton-say-banjruptcy-niot-the-sn 
wer.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Sharon Smith, Bankruptcy for Harrisburg Could Help 
Taxpayers But Taint Region, State, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (June 13, 2011), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/06/bankruptcy_could_help_tax
payer.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (quoting David Black, the president and 
CEO of the Harrisburg Regional Chamber of Commerce as saying that “[t]he 
impact of bankruptcy is more than just the city of Harrisburg. It’s on the 
commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and it’s on every municipality in 
Pennsylvania”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 368. See Dunstan McNichol, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Bond Rating Cut by 
Moody’s, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=apS4yfEwYa9E (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (reporting on 
the downgrading of Harrisburg’s municipal bonds) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 369. See Heather Long, Harrisburg and Bankruptcy: The Facts and The 
Myths, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (Sept. 18, 2010), http://www.pennlive.com/ 
editorials/index.ssf/2010/09/harrisburg_and_bankrtupcy_the.html (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2013) (quoting Governor Rendell as saying “if the city goes into 
bankruptcy, it will be the bankruptcy judge who decides. This step is to be 
avoided so that Harrisburg and its elected officials can control their own 
destiny”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As explained 
above, nothing could be farther from the truth. 
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When Harrisburg entered the Act 47 program a year before it 
filed for bankruptcy, political leaders at the state and local level 
split into two camps: the Act 47 camp and the bankruptcy 
camp.370 Business leaders were firmly in the Act 47 camp.371 This 
split illustrates the fact that even in states like Pennsylvania, 
where the authorization to file for bankruptcy is contained within 
the statute providing for state intervention in the fiscal affairs of 
its municipalities, policy makers can lose sight of the relationship 
between state intervention and Chapter 9. Harrisburg’s city 
council was at an impasse; a majority of the council members 
were unable to agree with the mayor on almost anything, having 
rejected both the Act 47 coordinator’s proposed plan as well as an 
alternative Act 47 plan proposed by the mayor.372 The standoff 
culminated in a late-night bankruptcy filing unsupported by the 
mayor that was dismissed six weeks later because of the city’s 
failure to meet the Chapter 9 eligibility requirements.373 For that 
reason, the state was justifiably concerned that a bankruptcy 
proceeding would burn through money without a successful 
resolution. If the council could not agree on whether to file for 
bankruptcy, it certainly would not have been able to agree on a 
Chapter 9 plan to adjust the city’s debts.  
In June 2011, three and a half months before Harrisburg 
filed for bankruptcy, the state legislature passed a law 
prohibiting Harrisburg and other cities that had received a 
distress determination from the DCED pursuant to Act 47 from 
filing for Chapter 9 altogether.374 The proponents of the ban 
                                                                                                     
 370. See Charles Thompson, Most at Harrisburg Fiscal Hearing Want 
Bankruptcy, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www. 
pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/10/most_at_harrisburg_fiscal_hear.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (identifying the mayor of Harrisburg as supporting 
entering Act 47, but “most of the dozen or so constituents who testified” as 
supporting proceeding straight to bankruptcy) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 371. See id. (recognizing the president of the chamber of commerce as 
favoring Act 47 because it could “provide just the guidance that city leaders 
need to get past their political and personal divisions and begin focusing on 
solutions”). 
 372. See Moringiello, supra note 21, at 243–44 (discussing the circumstances 
leading up to Harrisburg’s filing). 
 373. Id. 
 374. Act of June 30, 2011 (Act 26), P.L 159, No. 26 § 1.5 (using a tax code 
amendment to prohibit cities “of the third class” from filing a petition for relief 
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claimed that Harrisburg could adequately solve its problems in 
Act 47.375 Rather than strengthening its financial governance 
over its distressed cities, Pennsylvania left its most troubled 
cities to languish in a state program of dubious success without 
the leverage over recalcitrant creditors that a bankruptcy threat 
can provide. In hindsight, the state government was trying to 
solve an obvious governance problem; the mayor of Harrisburg 
and the majority of the City Council were at an impasse, and they 
could not agree on an Act 47 plan. If they could not agree on an 
Act 47 plan outside of bankruptcy, it was unlikely that they could 
ever agree on a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment with their creditors.  
Act 47, in its pre-2011 form, left the mayor and other 
members of the municipality’s government in their roles with full 
powers in all cases. On the one hand, this feature of Act 47 
respected the democratic process by allowing those chosen by a 
municipality’s residents to govern the municipality. On the other, 
however, Act 47 presumed the existence of a functioning city 
government led by leaders who agreed to cooperate with state 
intervention. The reality in Harrisburg did not mirror these 
assumptions. As a result, Pennsylvania moved to strengthen 
governance over its distressed cities shortly after Harrisburg filed 
for bankruptcy. Immediately after Harrisburg filed for 
bankruptcy, the legislature passed a bill allowing the governor to 
appoint a receiver for a city if that city is insolvent and has not 
adopted an Act 47 plan.376 At the time that law was passed, the 
                                                                                                     
under Chapter 9 “or any other Federal bankruptcy law,” despite the provisions 
of Act 47). Pennsylvania classifies its cities by population, and this prohibition 
was limited to cities of the Third Class. Id. Although most Pennsylvania cities 
are cities of the Third Class, the prohibition was enacted as a reaction to 
Harrisburg’s financial crisis. See In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 763 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (explaining the temporary prohibition on filing 
applicable to cities of the Third Class); see also Moringiello, supra note 21, at 
243 (discussing the legislation changes Pennsylvania made as a result of the 
financial crisis in Harrisburg). 
 375. See Marc Levy, Bill to Stop Harrisburg Bankruptcy Goes to Corbett, 
YORK DISPATCH (July 8, 2011), http://www.yorkdispatch.com/news/ci_18387764 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (identifying state senator Jeffrey Piccola as 
supporting the proposition that “[t]he city can address its problems through a 
law called Act 47”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 376. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.702 (2013) (providing for the 
appointment of a receiver by the Governor); see also Moringiello, supra note 21, 
at 243 (discussing the timeline of legislative action related to Harrisburg’s 
bankruptcy proceedings). 
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bankruptcy ban was still in place. Today, if a receiver is 
appointed, only the receiver can file a Chapter 9 petition for the 
city.377  
Receiverships are controversial. They should be; they remove 
the choice of leaders from the residents of a city.378 Pennsylvania, 
however, had an almost toothless state intervention scheme. The 
state was unable to do anything to resolve Harrisburg’s problems 
because of the acrimony on the City Council. The drafters of Act 
47 never anticipated that a city would reject a plan.379 The 
receivership provision therefore provided governance controls 
that were missing from the state intervention program. Although 
Pennsylvania has strengthened its ability to intervene in a city’s 
financial matters, Act 47 still does nothing to address the 
problems that arise from the state’s highly fragmented municipal 
structure in which thousands of municipalities, some very small, 
each provide their own public services.380  
Pennsylvania’s story clarifies a rationale that some authors 
have ascribed to municipal bankruptcy. Several scholars have 
suggested that Chapter 9 exists as a political tool: both Adam 
Levitin, writing about the wisdom of a bankruptcy chapter for 
states, and Clayton Gillette, writing about Chapter 9, have 
surmised that one use of a bankruptcy chapter for public entities 
could be to provide political cover for state or city officials in 
making unpopular decisions.381 Gillette has cited Harrisburg’s 
                                                                                                     
 377. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11701.706. Today, no municipality in 
Pennsylvania may file for bankruptcy without the approval of DCED. Id. 
§ 11701.261. 
 378. See supra notes 350–53 and accompanying text (discussing 
receiverships). 
 379. See Act 47 Hearing, supra note 361, at 19 (statement of Michael 
Gasbarre, Exec. Dir., Local Gov’t Comm’n of the Pa. Gen. Assembly) (“It is an 
accurate statement that those who crafted Act 47 never envisioned a situation 
where a distressed municipality would fail to adopt either the coordinator’s 
solvency plan or an alternative that could be drafted by a municipality’s chief 
executive officer or governing body.”). 
 380. See PA. ECON. LEAGUE, BEYOND ACT 47: A CALL TO ACTION (2013), 
http://pelcentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Beyond-Act-47-_revised_.pdf 
(“Pennsylvania’s municipalities are broken into thousands of little puzzle pieces 
with each one offering—and funding—its own distinct brand of public safety and 
public works services.”). 
 381. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 16, at 319–20 (discussing the strategic use 
of municipal bankruptcy); Levitin, supra note 16, at 1446 (discussing 
bankruptcy as a political tool). 
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failed bankruptcy as an example of a strategic use of Chapter 9 
by a city to escape unfavorable conditions placed by the state on 
its assistance.382 Bankruptcy can indeed be a political tool, but in 
a different way from that suggested by Gillette and Levitin. A 
city’s credible threat to file for Chapter 9 can serve as a wake-up 
call to state officials who have paid little attention to their state’s 
authorization statutes. In Pennsylvania, a state with many 
distressed municipalities, the bankruptcy threat by the state 
capital did just that. Harrisburg’s dispute with the state led to a 
short-lived absolute ban on bankruptcy filings by certain cities, 
but it also forced the state to grapple with the governance 
deficiencies in its municipal distress intervention program. Once 
the state restored Chapter 9 as an option, which it did in 
November 2012, Harrisburg’s creditors moved towards an out-of-
bankruptcy resolution of the city’s debt problems.383 
VII. Where the Holes Are: Issues for Judicial or Legislative 
Resolution 
Because so few general-purpose municipalities of any size 
had filed for Chapter 9 before Vallejo, California, filed in 2008, it 
is difficult to evaluate, as an empirical matter, the success of 
Chapter 9 in relieving a city of its financial distress so that the 
city, with the help of its state, can return to viability. Vallejo, a 
city in a state that has refused to provide reorganizational 
oversight, continues to struggle,384 and the bankruptcy of Central 
                                                                                                     
 382. Clayton P. Gillette, Bankruptcy and Its By-Products: A Comment on 
Skeel, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 1129, 1141 (2013); see also Gillette, supra note 16, at 
286 (“[L]ocal officials may use the threat of bankruptcy to reduce the conditions 
that states place on a proposed bailout.”). As explained above, Pennsylvania 
placed more restrictive controls on Harrisburg after it made good on its threat to 
file for bankruptcy. 
 383. See Donald Gilliland, Why Not Bankruptcy for Harrisburg’s Debt? A 
Closer Look at The Receiver’s Strategy, PENNLIVE.COM (July 24, 2013, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/07/why_not_bankruptcy_for_h
arrisb.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (explaining how the availability of 
Chapter 9 as an option helped the receiver for Harrisburg to negotiate with the 
city’s creditors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 384. See Bobby White, In Vallejo, Scars Still Visible, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19. 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020455590457716701345 
5352608.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (explaining the cuts in public services 
that persist after Vallejo’s filing and the attendant concerns about crime; also 
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Falls, in a state that provided robust rehabilitative governance, 
had a positive effect on that city’s credit and that of other Rhode 
Island cities.385 Harrisburg is on track to solve its problems under 
Pennsylvania’s strengthened oversight statute without resort to 
bankruptcy.386 
The foregoing illustrates that Chapter 9 may only be as 
effective as the state municipal oversight structure within which 
it operates. This is not a new observation; in the 1930s, the 
original proponents of a municipal bankruptcy law feared that 
any such law would be useless without it being integrated into 
state plans for municipal rehabilitation.387 Because the design of 
municipal bankruptcy law anticipates that the states will provide 
reorganizational governance over the debtor, concerns about the 
effectiveness of Chapter 9 should not focus on its absence of 
Chapter 11-style governance controls. Rather, questions about 
the efficacy of Chapter 9 should fall into three categories: those 
about each state’s acceptance of the Code’s invitation to exercise 
                                                                                                     
pointing out that because Vallejo did not scale back its pension payments in 
bankruptcy, it may be unable to make them in the future) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 385. See, e.g., Central Falls Bankruptcy Credit Positive for Rhode Island 
Cities: Moody’s, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
09/13/rhodeisland-central-falls-moodys-idUSL1E8KDITQ20120913 (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2013) (quoting a Moody’s commentary that approval of Central Falls 
bankruptcy “is a credit positive for other distressed Rhode Island cities because 
it shows a path to emerging from bankruptcy without defaulting on G.O. debt”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Moody’s Upgrades Formerly 
Bankrupt Central Falls, R.I., REUTERS (July 18, 2013), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2013/07/18/usa-rhodeisland-centralfalls-rating-idUSL1N0FO27920 
130718 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (reporting that Moody’s belief “that Central 
Falls will maintain its structural balance and keep making its full annual 
pension obligations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Robust 
governance was not the only reason the bond market responded positively to the 
Central Falls bankruptcy. Shortly before the city filed, the state enacted a law 
granting secured status to general obligation bonds, thus giving them priority 
over obligations to employees and retirees. R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 45-12-1 (2013). 
 386. See Emily Previti, State Officials File ‘Harrisburg Strong Plan’ for 
Resolving City’s Debt, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/08/harrisburg_debt_plan_filed.
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (explaining that the receiver for Harrisburg 
filed a debt adjustment plan with the Commonwealth court on August 26, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 387. See supra notes 249–55 and accompanying text (discussing municipal 
bankruptcy legislation and scholarship from the 1930s). 
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Chapter 9 governance; those about what the state is accepting if 
it allows its cities to file for Chapter 9; and those about the extent 
to which a court can exercise bankruptcy governance over a 
municipal debtor if a state allows municipal bankruptcy but 
declines the invitation to participate in the debtor’s 
rehabilitation. In Part V above, I addressed the first category of 
questions. In this section, I will address the second and third 
categories.  
A. Continuing Questions about the Relationship Between State 
and Federal Law 
The relationship between state law and bankruptcy law is 
one that scholars have studied and questioned for decades. 
Uncertainty about the relationship between the two is not unique 
to municipal bankruptcy; over thirty years ago, shortly after the 
passage of the current Code, Theodore Eisenberg pronounced the 
Code a failure because of its “inadequate coordination with 
preexisting federal and state laws.”388 The proper function of all 
types of bankruptcy depends on the interplay between 
bankruptcy law and myriad state and other federal laws.389  
Uncertainty surrounds Chapter 9 because its rare use has 
produced few published judicial opinions interpreting and 
applying its provisions. The history of Chapter 9 illustrates an 
attempt to strike a careful balance between state and federal 
interests, and as large municipalities file for bankruptcy, the 
relationship between state and federal law in resolving municipal 
financial distress requires further refinement.  
The constitutional foundations of municipal bankruptcy law 
raise a question of how far bankruptcy law can go to upset state 
law entitlements. For example, before Detroit filed for 
                                                                                                     
 388. Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 
953, 953 (1981). 
 389. See Karen Gross, A Response to J.J. White’s Death and Resurrection of 
Secured Credit: Finding Some Trees But Missing the Forest, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 203, 216–17 (2004) (explaining that all Chapter 11 cases “involve the 
interplay of other bodies of law, other disciplines and the market”). There are 
many examples of bankruptcy law’s dependence on state law. Perhaps the two 
most prominent are the Code’s definitions of property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541 (2012), and of claims, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). 
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bankruptcy, several groups sued in state court claiming that 
because the Michigan constitution protects employee pensions,390 
a bankruptcy filing would be unconstitutional.391 Although the 
mere act of filing for Chapter 9 should not violate this 
constitutional provision because a plan of adjustment does not 
necessarily impair pension rights, the Emergency Manager’s 
stated intention to reduce pensions392 will ensure that questions 
regarding the relationship between state and federal law will not 
disappear. 
Two bankruptcy courts have provided an answer to this 
question. Retirees in Stockton, California, claimed that the 
contracts clause in the California constitution protected their 
health benefits even in bankruptcy.393 In that dispute, the court 
looked at bankruptcy authorization as an all-or-nothing 
proposition: If a state authorizes municipal bankruptcy, it must 
accept all of Chapter 9’s provisions, which include the possibility 
of a cramdown plan that forces creditors to accept less than what 
they are owed.394 In short, a state can condition its cities’ entry 
into Chapter 9, but it cannot revise it.395 In his ruling that Detroit 
met the eligibility requirements for Chapter 9, Judge Steven 
Rhodes relied on the reasoning in Stockton to hold that Chapter 9 
allows Detroit to impair its pension obligations, notwithstanding 
the prohibition on doing so found in the Michigan Constitution.396 
                                                                                                     
 390. See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each 
pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions 
shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or 
impaired thereby.”). 
 391. Bill Vlasic, Federal Judge Halts Legal Challenges in Detroit Bankruptcy 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A14.   
 392. CITY OF DETROIT, PROPOSAL TO CREDITORS 109 (2013), http://www. 
freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4206913614.PDF.  
 393. See Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. City of Stockton, Cal. (In re City of 
Stockton, Cal.), 478 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (“The retirees contend 
they have vested contractual rights that are protected from impairment by the 
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, a similar clause in the 
California Constitution, and by other provisions of California law.”). 
 394. See id. at 16 (“A state cannot rely on the § 903 reservation of state 
power to condition or to qualify, i.e. to ‘cherry pick,’ the application of the 
Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply in Chapter 9 cases after such a case has 
been filed.”). 
 395. Id. at 17. 
 396. Opinion Regarding Eligibility at 74–80, In re City of Detroit, 9:13-bk-
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Assuming that a state must accept Chapter 9 in toto, it is 
often unclear exactly what total acceptance means. Where 
Chapter 9 incorporates Chapter 11 standards, the incorporation 
is sometimes poorly tailored to the realities of municipal financial 
distress. For example, in order for a Chapter 9 plan to be 
confirmed, the plan must be “in the best interests of creditors.”397 
To meet that standard, a Chapter 11 plan must pay all creditors 
at least what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.398 
That standard is unworkable in a Chapter 9 case because a 
municipality cannot be liquidated, nor can its assets be sold 
outside of bankruptcy in a forced sale.399 As a result, courts hold 
that a plan of adjustment meets the best interests standard when 
the plan is better than all alternatives.400  
Although Chapter 9 permits a cramdown plan, a court may 
confirm such a plan only if it is “fair and equitable.”401 In 
Chapter 11, that standard requires that unsecured creditors be 
paid in full before shareholders get anything.402 The standard 
does not translate well to Chapter 9; cities do not have 
shareholders. Courts have therefore interpreted it to mean that 
Chapter 9 creditors will receive all that they “‘can reasonably 
expect under the circumstances.’”403 There is very little case law 
                                                                                                     
53846-SWR (Bankr. E.D. Mich. entered Dec. 5, 2013) (No. 1945), 
http://content.foxtvmedia.com/wjbk/pdf/OPINION-REGARDING-
ELIGIBILITY.pdf. 
 397. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012). 
 398. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
 399. See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text (discussing 
municipality features). 
 400. See In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. 1989) (ruling that 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) “simply requires the Court to 
make a determination of whether or not the plan as proposed is better than the 
alternatives”). 
 401. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(1) (incorporating the “fair and equitable” standard of 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) through 11 U.S.C. § 901(a)). 
 402. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04[3] 
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013) (explaining that 
§ 1129(b) requires full payment to an unsecured creditor; if the unsecured 
creditor cannot be paid in full, “they have to be assured that no junior creditor 
or equity participant receive anything under the plan”). 
 403. Lorber v. Vista. Irrigation Dist, 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942) 
(quoting Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 680, 685 (9th 
Cir. 1940)). 
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interpreting the standard, however, justifying creditor incertitude 
about Chapter 9 treatment. The vague confirmation standards 
may play a key role in encouraging creditor cooperation in 
Chapter 9.404 
The confirmation standards also implicate the relationship 
between state and federal law. The Code states that in order for a 
Chapter 9 plan to be confirmed, the debtor must not be 
“prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out 
the plan.”405 That raises the question of whether a municipal 
debtor in a state with constitutional pension protections can 
propose a plan that modifies pensions that will be confirmed by 
the court. If bankruptcy authorization is an all-or-nothing 
proposition, the answer should be yes, but again, case law is 
scant. In one of the few cases interpreting this requirement, the 
court held that reading it to prohibit a plan of adjustment from 
reducing payments to bondholders in contravention of state law 
would defeat the entire purpose of Chapter 9.406 According to that 
court, the plan going forward must comply with state law.407 As a 
result, Detroit should be able to restructure its pension 
obligations in its Chapter 9 plan, but any restructured employee 
benefits would be subject to Michigan’s constitutional protections 
after plan confirmation. 
B. Debtor Governance in Weak Governance States 
Although municipal bankruptcy law was designed to 
facilitate state rehabilitation schemes, Chapter 9 does not require 
that a state play any role in a municipal bankruptcy case other 
than to authorize filing. Some states, such as Alabama and 
                                                                                                     
 404. See B. Summer Chandler & Mark S. Kauffman, Maybe Taxes Aren’t So 
Certain: What is “Fair and Equitable” in a Chapter 9 Plan?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Feb. 2013, at 12, 70 (noting that the “uncertainty may motivate a municipality 
and its creditors to reach agreement on debt relief, rather than turning to a 
court to decide the issue”). 
 405. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012). 
 406. See In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. 1989) (stating that under such a ruling, “the whole purpose and 
structure of Chapter 9 would be of little value”). 
 407. See id. (ruling that new bonds issued pursuant to the debtor’s plan of 
adjustment “must be issued in conformance with state law”). 
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California, have declined to exercise reorganizational governance 
over their Chapter 9 debtors.408 In those states, a Chapter 9 filing 
can only result in a fresh start unless the municipality itself has 
a plan to resolve the structural problems that led to the filing. 
If the fresh start is the goal of Chapter 9 in states that do not 
provide reorganizational governance, it may be up to the 
bankruptcy courts to ensure that only worthy municipal debtors 
file for bankruptcy, just as they do when an individual files for 
bankruptcy. The Code lets them do so; although some of the entry 
requirements are objectively determinable, such as whether the 
debtor is insolvent409 and whether it is authorized by its state to 
file,410 others leave more discretion in the bankruptcy judge. The 
Chapter 9 eligibility requirements both invite the state to provide 
rehabilitative governance over the debtor and allow a court to 
exercise a measure of bankruptcy governance.411 For example, a 
municipality can be a debtor only if it “desires to effect a plan to 
adjust” its debts,412 if it first negotiates in good faith with its 
creditors,413 and if it files its petition in good faith.414 These entry 
requirements give a court some discretion in determining 
whether a filing is likely to have some benefit for the city or will 
simply result in a drawn-out process with little benefit to the 
debtors or its creditors.415 When the state plays no role in the 
bankruptcy, the court may play a larger role in encouraging 
negotiation, such as by the appointment of a mediator.416 Each 
                                                                                                     
 408. See supra notes 312–13, 333 and accompanying text (discussing 
municipal bankruptcy governance in Alabama and California). 
 409. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2012). 
 410. Id. § 109(c)(2). 
 411. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (detailing the eligibility 
requirements for Chapter 9). 
 412. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4). 
 413. Id. § 109(c)(5). The municipality may be excused from this requirement 
if it shows that negotiation with creditors would be impracticable. Id. 
§ 109(c)(5)(C). 
 414. See id. § 921(c) (allowing the court to dismiss a petition that is not filed 
in good faith). 
 415. See In re City of Stockton, Cal., 493 B.R. 772, 794 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
2013) (stating that the good faith requirement “serves a policy objective of 
assuring that the Chapter 9 process is being used in a manner consistent with 
the reorganization purposes of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
 416. See id. at 783 (referencing the court-ordered mediation process for 
Stockton’s municipal bankruptcy); see also In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-
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state must decide whether municipal bankruptcy should facilitate 
more than a fresh start; in states where the fresh start is the only 
goal of a Chapter 9 case, the court must ensure that the case can 
achieve that goal.  
VIII. Conclusion 
A city’s descent into financial distress forces a new look at 
rarely used laws. Municipal bankruptcies are rare, and because 
Chapter 9 filings are few and far between, the body of case law 
that has developed to govern them is small. Because decades 
passed between the passage of the first municipal bankruptcy 
legislation and the possibility that a major city would have to use 
it, the original purpose of Chapter 9 was forgotten.  
Chapter 9 was never intended to serve as a comprehensive 
scheme to solve municipal financial problems; it was designed to 
complement state efforts to solve those problems. Chapter 9 does 
indeed anticipate restructuring governance over a municipal 
debtor, but in the hands of the state, not in the hands of a 
bankruptcy judge. That governance concession is consistent with 
the original goals of the predecessor to Chapter 9. 
Concluding that Chapter 9 accommodates appropriate debtor 
governance, however, does not answer the question of whether 
Chapter 9 is an effective financial restructuring tool for cities. 
Chapter 9 may only be as effective as each state’s plan for 
municipal fiscal oversight. This conclusion does, however, allow 
researchers and policy makers to focus on the role of each state in 
developing an effective mechanism to not only resolve the 
financial distress of its municipalities but develop sensible 
structures for their municipalities going forward. This 
mechanism should include both robust state oversight and the 
safety valve of Chapter 9 if necessary to overcome holdout 
creditors. 
  
                                                                                                     
53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2013) (order appointing a mediator and 
submitting the case to mediation). In the latter case, the state is responsible for 
developing the Chapter 9 plan through Detroit’s Emergency Manager. See supra 
notes 340–49 and accompanying text (discussing Detroit’s use of an emergency 
manger). 
